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This study was made tor the purpose of investigating the 
part played by the colonies in the Caribbean area in the revolt 01 
the thirteen British colonies ot our Atlantic seaboard from the 
mother country. The Spanish, French. and Dutch possessions ot the 
\,test Indies and the British colonies had important commercial 
products_ They were tar from the direct control of their respec~ 
ti va mother countries and were in the A.merican scene. This paper 
will attempt to show precisely how much and in what manner some of 
these colonies helped or hindered the North American revolution-
aries. 
The lack of material and the limitation of space and 
time have narrowed this study to the influence of St. Eustatius, 
jthe role of the French \iest Indies. the action ot the French ~Jest 
Indian fleet, and the aid, both secret and open, sent by France to 
~he North American colonists, without which the ~evolution would 
!have tailed. 
A brief historical background of the West Indies is 
p.ecessary to the undars~anding of the situation. 
1 
2 
Near the end of the sixteenth century Sir Richard Gren-
ville and Sir Walter Raleigh, and a little later Captain John 
Smith and others, in the hunt tor eligible sites for colonies, 
paid special attention tor awhile to the Orinoco region, lured 
partly by the entiCing legends of El Dorado. In their wanderings 
from South to Nar~h America, where they founded the Virginia 
colony, they were wont to pause among the Caribaes, and they did 
not forget the prospect for colonizing thereabouts. Such adven-
turous spirits had no respect for the Spanish title of possession 
or rear of the native inhabitants. For a time, however. English-
~en were kept busy in Guiana and after the turn ot the century on 
ithe North American coast at Virginia and l~ew England. The French 
~ad made rough beginnings still farther north in Canada and had 
~een feeding an appetite for possessions in newly discovered lands 
~ey grew desirous of a share in the tropical islands with whose 
charms the corsairs had already made intimate acquaintance.. The 
~etherland. had begun operations with a trading company which 
~irst took possession where now the city of New York stands. 
Dutch smugp~er8 had long been prowling about the Spanish islands 
With a specIal headquarters in the island ot St. Eustat1us, from 
which they were driven, only to return. A so-called admiral of 
the Dutch took San Juan de Puerto aleo in 1615. but was killed far 
his pains and no advantage eame of it. In 1621 the Dutch West 
India Cornpany was incorporated, which had colonizing. as well as 
trading, purposes.1 
The Spanish colonization had been confined virtually to 
the Greater Antilles. A tew settlers had taken possession of the 
islandJ adjacent to the Spanish Main. including Trinidad and CUra-
cao. They were practically lett undisturbed in 'l'rinidad until 
near the close at the eighteenth century. except tor the unceremo-
nious call ot Sir Wa.lter Raleigh two hundred years before. The 
Dutch. whose title was altogether one of conquest (acquired during 
the war between Spain and the Netherlands), captured Curacao and 
its neighboring islands, Buenes Aires and Aruba, in 1634. and 
slowly colonized them. Spain retained the rest ot what she called 
~he "Sotavento," or Leeward, group ot islands. the finest ot which 
was Margarita. until they went with Venezuela upon the achievement 
at her independence. 2 
The t !rat otfi cia! English settlement in the Weat Indie, 
was made in 1624 by Sir Thomas Warner and his associates. They 
first took possession ot the island of St.Chr1stopher, extending 
their claim to Nieves, which was C10S8 by, and which was Angli-
cized into Nevis. At this t.ime there was one of those French 
72-73. 
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adventurers generally called corsairs, by the name ot Esnambuc, 
prowling around. In a tussle with a Spanish galleon which he had 
failed to capture, his vessel was crippled, and he put in a.t 
St. Christopher for repairs. The English and French were then on 
friendly terms, and as Warner was having a hard time with the 
natives, he struck a bargain with Esnambue tor a combination 
against the Caribs and an equitable division of the island. This 
was in 1625. They had a hard struggle with the paeans * who per-
sisted in trying to hold their own, but tinally succeeded in 
quelling, killing, and driving them out. In 1629. the Spanish 
from Hispaniola. who regarded this as an intrusion upon their 
neglected preserves, made an unexpected visit and broke up the 
settlements, driving the colonists away. St. Christopher was al-
ways called the ftHother Colony" by the English and the "Mere 
d' Antilles" by the French. \'ihen the colonists returned alter the 
first expulsion, England and France 'Were having a quarrel, and 
each claimed exclusive possession. The island passed from one to 
the other several times, and was finally confirmed to Great 
Britain.' 
The French refugees of 1629 trom St. Kitt's. as it came 
irreverently to be called. joined with other outcasts and 
. J. Nellis· rel. Crouse t ~ P&gne'EI lD. llll2. ~ ~41!1. 
1624-1664, New York, 1940, lo-)~ 
; 
adventurers to seize upon the small island of Tortuga near the 
north-western extremity ot Haiti. This piratical island was the 
means or tinally wresting all the western part ot Hispaniola from 
Spain. Sir Thomas Warner's colonists, who W€.lre recruited from 
tune to time, had strayed over to Barbuda in 1628. and some who 
were associated with him were among the settlers of Barbados even 
ear liar, though the main colony there came out from England in 
, , 
1625. In 1632, Warner took possession at Antigua and ~iontserrat, 
but a formidable rival was looming up. After the death ot James ~ 
the sham alliance with Spain was ended, and in 1627, King Charles 
presumed to grant the whole range or the Caribaee to the Earl of 
Carlisle.. This led to connicting claims t till the Cromwell re-
gime intervened to suspend them. Antigua, Barbuda. and some ot 
~he other northern islands were uninhabited when first taken, and 
others were the resort of,smugelers and freebooters with whom 
~hese waters were infested. The infant colonies first planted 
bere did not thrive, and after the Restoration a new settlement 
was made in Antigua under Lord Willoughby (to whom the island was 
. , 
granted by Charles n), and the Earl of Car11sle. In 1680, Bar-
buda was given to the Codrington family.4 
6 
Dutch settlers took possession of St. Euatatius in 1635 1 
and, although it did not escape attack in the wars which followed I 
that and the neighboring island of Saba were finally confirmed in 
the possession or Holland,. Dutch emugglers were the first to 
occupy Tortola" but they were not colonists, and \fere succeeded 
by some English Quakers 'Who held peaceful possession, but were 
ruined by emancipating their slaves,. St. Martin in 16:;8 was a 
headquarters for French rovers, or corsairs, but the Dutch _-
glere divided its possession with them, and in 16)8 an amicable 
division ot the island between French and Dutch was effected. The 
same year French colonists settled in St. Bartholomew. All this 
northern, part ot the Lesser Antilles was sparsely peopled and 
feebly held by the aborigines t , and after one or two spasmodic 
efforts Spain gave up all at tempt to exclude other nations from 
them. S 
Early in the seventeenth century, Spain's exclusive 
right to possession in the ~est Indies came to be seriously con-
tested. By l6sg the Pope formally gave up the problem and in 1670 
claims were abandoned by Spa1n herself. For nearly two centuries 
there was almost continuous war in which one or the other of the 
colonizing powers was engaged. There were frequent contests tor 
S ~.f 75-76. 
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the possession of these islands, especially those of the Lesser 
Antilles. As we have already seen, some ot the original colonies 
were established by conquest.6 
The nine years t:ouce ended in 1618, and hostilities wert 
renewed between Spain and the Netherlands~ England made a treaty 
with the latter power in 1625 which brought her into conflict wit} 
Spain again~ It was in 1629 that the Spanish fleet made the at-
tack upon St~ Christopher and drove out both English and French 
settlers. In 1632 the Dutch took Tobago, and in l634, Ouracao. 
After the French took nominal possession of Guadeloupe, Dominica, 
. . 
and Martinique in 1635, France was at war with Spain, which had 
previously made peace wi th England~ In 1638 the Spanish made a 
descent upon St. Martin, which was jointly occupied by the French 
and Dutch, and took forcible possession~ It was afterwards re-
covered and formal division of the island between Dutch and Frencll 
was made in 1648. Although Spain and England were nominally at 
peace in 1638, an Enclish expedition attacked and plundered the 
town of Santiago de la Vega in Jamaica. In retaliation a Spanish 
fleet trom Havana cleared out the inf'ant settlement at }Jew Provi-
dence in the Bahamas.7 
6 1;&4., 92. 
1 11>,4-, 92 .. 93. 
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During the Commonwealth, the royalist sentiment was 
strong in the British West Indieo~ There was almost a revolt 
under Governor Willoughby in Barbados; but a fleet came out with 
Admiral Ayscue and settled the troublfl, inciden'tally capturing 
some Duteh vessels on the way. Cromwell adopted a vigorous polie) 
in dealing with the pretensions ot Spain, and it was at this time 
that the fleet was sent against Hispaniola and compromised by 
capturing J&llaica, which Spain tried in vain to recover in 165$., 
There wa. a treaty of peace between France and Spain in 1660. _ The 
restoration of Charles II also brougnt peace between England and 
France j but in 1665 England tell out w1th the Dutch, who were 
joined the next year by France. Then the English and French in 
St. Kitt IS took to fighting. The French got the upper hand and 
drove the English out. but a neat came, up from Barbados and 
reversed the process. At the same time the French captured Anti-
[:;'lla and Montserrat, but by the treaty of B!'eda in 1667 they were 
~e3tored to England. and the old division ot St. Kitt's was re-
established. Trouble kept up for some years with pr1vateer'ing and 
plundering upon the thriving trade ot the Dutch. No further 
changes ot po4lsession among the islands took place until the war 
between France and Holland in 1688. when the accession of William 
of Orange brought England into the contest on the Dutch side. The 
French again drove the English out of St, Kitt's and seised St. 
Eustatius. While the En~~ish made unsuccessful attacks upon 
9 
Guadeloupe. The peace ot Ryswick, 1697. restol'"ed the old condi-
tion, the Dutch retaining St. Euatatius and the French and EnelisJ 
still dividing St. Christophcr.S 
From 1102 to 1715 there was a war, with England and 
Holland on one side and France and Spain on the other. Much 
privateering and plundering went on, but- there was no change ot 
territorial possession, except that the English drove the French 
out of St. Kitt fa this time. By the treaty of Utrecht the island 
'Was .finally ceded to Clr-eat BrItain. Jacques Cassard, the famous 
French corsair. in the guise of a patr:lotic privateer, captured 
St. Eustatius and Curacao, but only for the purpose ot extorting 
a ransom. There was a fierce contest between France and England 
for the possession of the Carlbees during the Seven Years t \lar 
from 1756 to 176). In the meantime,Spain and Holland had been 
losing prestige and were no longer rated as formidable powers.9 
It was in this contest between France and England that 
Admiral Rodney and Sir Samuel Hood first came to the front as 
British naval commanders. At the beginning, the French were in 
possession ot all the southern Oaribees. leaving Barbados and 
8 ~ •• 93-9~. 
9 ~ •• 94-. 
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Trinidad out or the category. The English captured Guadeloupe in 
1759, before the arrival of the home fleet, and held it till the 
end ot the war. Uodney sailed trom Barbados for Martinique in 
January, 1162, with eighteen ships of the line and a considerable 
force of soldiers. The island capitulated, and the conquest was 
foll~/ed up with that of Grenada. Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent. 
and St. Lucia in succession. Spain was involved in the quarrel 
at the ti~e, and 1n P,1ay, 1162, Admiral Pocock. laid seige to 
Havana. In a month Morro Castle w~s reduced, and soon after the 
Governor ... General of Cuba capitulated when Lord Albemarle took 
possession with land force/.:$. These naval victories contributed 
po'Werrul~y to the peace of February, 1163. By the treaty ot 
. . 
Paris, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St. Lucia were restol'ed to 
~rance, and Cuba was left to Spain in exchange for Florida. While 
l 
Domil),ica, St. Vincent. Grenada, and Tobago were ceded to Great 
aritain. 
Tbe next clnteat for the possession of islands in the 
IUGSSer Antilles came after France had joined the United 3tates in 
1778 in their struggle lor independence from Great Drltain.10 
10 ~.t 95. 
THE ROLE O}' ST. EUSTATIUS 
At the outbreak ot the American ~evolution the colonist, 
wero far from being self-sufficient. It was evident from the be-
ginning that outside help would be necessary if independence was 
to be won. \'/hsre was this immediate help to be obtained? Since 
the coloniats had already established illegal trade relations witl 
the ttest Indies f it seemed only logical to continue this trade to 
obtain the supplies needed. 
Gunpowder was one of the greatest needs.. Bocause of 
this lackot powder, tho different co~onial governr:1ents. the Con-
tinental Congress. and even private individuals atter:lpted to im-
port saltpetre and powder as well as manu!'acture them at home. 
Georgia. was the only colony which did not import either oil these 
before the fall of l777.1 
. 1 Orlando W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in ' 
1776", ~r~CAD ",lt2r~£il &eviIX, January, 1925. New York, 1925. 
XXX, 27 • 
11 
12 
Almost all the powder imported during the first two and 
a halt years ot the war came from France by way of the West 
Indies. Many or the carrying ships, following legalities, merely 
touched at those islands on their way to colonial ports. These 
supplied were obtained in exchange far colonial products, some ot 
whi ch went no larther than the West Indies, while some were for-
warded to France. Probably eighty per cent of the imported salt-
petre and powder reaching our shores came as a direct ,result of 
the etforts put forth by authorities in the different countries 
and by the Continental Congress. 2 
During this period, over one hundred different ships 
brought supplies to our shores. From this we conclude that the 
patrol ot British war ships along the Atlantic coast tell far 
short ot establishing an effective blockade, and that full advan-
tage was taken of the chances or getting through. Furthermore, 
the arrival of so many vessels suggests that the French govern-
ment both eecretly encouraged, and, at times, openly connived at 
the illicit business carried on by her merchants in France and in 
the West Indies. Had there been a serious inclination on the part 
of the French government to do so, doubtless it could have put a 
2 lQid., 279. 
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stop to the shipping of military stores to the Americans. The 
total quantity of powder and other munitions allowed to come here 
trom France and from ports under French control helps in a way to 
measure the desire of the French government to break up the 
~ritish colonial empire and secure a part of it for France. It 
l'le1ps also to measure her disappointment at not being able to 
retrieve her losses of 1763.3 
Be·cause of the close association of the fortunes of St. 
~ustatius with those of the American Revolutionary War, and the 
limportant part which it played in aiding the colonists to continue 
~hat difficult and unequal struggle, the story of this tiny island 
~s worth telling. J. Franklin Jameson has written an article en ... 
~itled "St. Euatatiu8 in the American i1.evolution" which appeared 
~n .llu1 AmeriSM H!llCgr lSa.L j+ev6. of 1903. Some ot the material 
~n St. Eustatius used in this study i8 based on this article. 
Located near the northeast corner of the west Indian 
phain, St. Eustatius is neither large nor fertile. It is less 
r..han seven square miles in area, and did not produce more than six 
ltmdred barrels of sugar a year at the time of the Revolution. 
ts fortifications were never important, and it had only one 
3 .nwt. 
14. 
landing-place. However. its position among the West Indian 1s-
lands was such as to give it, in the hands ot the Dutch, excep-
tional advantages. Under the old system of colonial management, 
typified by the Navigation Acts, each country endeavored to mo-
nopolize the commerce of its colonies. The Dutch, however, had 
been converted to the principles ot colonial tree trade. Accord-
ingly,St. Eustatius. a free port belonging to a highly commercial 
~ation and located in the middle ot rich and prosperous English, 
, , 
French, Spanish, and Danish colonies managed under a restrictive 
system, ha.d, even in times of peace, the opportunity to become an 
important mart or trade.4. 
When war existed between England and France or Spain, 
~d the prohibitions of mutual intercourse between the islands 
~ere enforced by vigilant cruisers and eager privateers, the 
~eutral trade or St. Eustatlu8 flourished still more, and drew a 
~ar larger population than it had in peaceful days.5 
Let us go back to the beginning of the war t and espe-
cially to the days beiore the French alliance t when it was merely 
Ia conflict between Great Britain and her revolted colonies and had 
4. J. Franklin Jameson, "St. Eustatiu8 in the American 




not widened into a European war. The war. and the non-import at ion 
.,hich preceded it, had cut otf at one blow the supply of British 
~anuractures to the American colonies. 
It was true that the native American inventiveness would in 
time supply their place. The mu~e 1ngloriua 'hired men' who 
would do anything with a jack-knife, the versatile Jonas ot 
Mr. Abbot t s tancy. we uld blossom forth as the Yankee inven .... 
tor. But this would take time; and. in the meanwhile, it was 
very convenient to have in the neutral. islands of the l'iest 
Indies a,6means of temporary supply and a market for American 
exports. 
The trade ventures of states 8.8'we11 as of individuals were often 
carried on in this way. For instance, Abraham van Sibber, agent 
ot the state of Maryland at St. Eustatius, was taking care of 
cargoes sent or underwritten by the state, as aarly as March. 
1776. There are letters from him, addresued to the Virginia com-
~ttee of safety in the archives of Virginia. In June of the same 
year, Van Blbber of- st. Eustatiws and Richard Harrison of Joiartl,. 
~ique announced that they had formed a partnership. and solicited 
a portion of their custom trom the Virginia committee.? 
When France entered the war on the side ot the American~ 
French islands like Martinique and French carriers became lnell-
. glble to conduct such a trade. and the position of the Dutch 
6 ~., 684-685. 
7 ~b&d.t 68,. 
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neutrals became doubly profitable. British merchants stored thell 
goods at St. Eustatius to keep them safe in case ot an attack by 
the French. John Adams, in 1779, wrote to the president of Oon-
gress saying that closer diplomatic relations with the republic 
of the United rletherlanda would be justified because ot the grow-
ing trade through the island ot St. Eustatius. 8 British armed 
vessals were enabled to cruise ott the Azorea and in other situa-
tions well adapted for checking the voyages ot French and Spanish 
vessels to the West Indies because ot the close diplomatic rela-
tiousbetween Portugal and Great Br1tain.9 This threw West In-
dian commerce more and more into the hands of· the Dutch and of St~ 
Eustatius. Jameson otter. two examples. He tells of a Dutch reu 
admiral who, during thirteen months there, reports that over 
thirty-one hundred vessels sailed trom the island during the time 
ot his stay. An English observer reports that in 1779 80me twelve 
thousand hogshead. of tobacco and one and a half million ounces of 
indigo came to it from North America. to be eXCh&lged tor naval 
s llWl •• 68,5-686. 
9 Francu \1harton, ad. f .Trut iIX2,ytiQ'1ft !1,Dl.suQQt;&g Qorr_esoondence Slt. ~ Un.t:ed WCilttl-;-Washington. 9, III, 
~17"'71S 
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supplies and other goods from Europe.10 British traders, suppos-
edly bound tor St. Christopher, would embark on trading ventures 
to St. Euatatius. They were careful, however, to take out sepa-
rate insurance policies on the two voyages from England to St. 
Christopher and from there to St. Eustatius. This trade with the 
neutral islands was encouraged by ~ act pD.ssed in 1780, although 
the trade with the revolting colonies was not approved. ll 
During the Revolutionary War, St. Eustatius was the 
quickest and safest, and at times the most important. means ot 
communication between American representatives abroad and the 
Continental Congress at home. In Marcil, 1777 t Lord Suffolk was 
inf'ormed by an agent at Rotterdam that Messrs. Willing and l<1orria 
of Philadelphia had written to a Rotterdam merchant that he could 
write by way o£ St. Euatat1ua. because they would have regular 
communication with that 1sland.12 
Ordinarily the enrichment of the Dutch West Indies 'Would 
~ot have grieved the British. Britieh resentment against St. 
~ustatlus was aroused to such a violent pitch by the fact that the 
10 Jarneson, "St. Euatatius in the I~erican Revolution. n 
11 .:Ql~~ 
12 l.lllSl. 
-island was made the means of an enormous export ot military sup-
plies to the American armies, and later of naval supplies to the 
maritime torces arrayed against England in the Caribbean. On 
~rch 20, 1175, at Yorke's in8istance, the States General ot the 
United Netherlands issued a proclamation forbidding the exporta-
~ion of warlike stores or ammunition to the British colonies in 
America or to any other place without the permisSion of one ot the 
polleges ot Admiralty. The tremendous increase in trade from st-. 
~ustatiu. had been noted as early as the end of 1774. All during 
~hat winter there were two agents trom Boston at Amsterdam buying 
stores and gunpowder. The Dutch prohibition was constantly evaded 
even after it was published. The "admiralties" were not too vigl-
.ant about executing the prohibition ot the States General and the 
pOWlctl ot State. Beeauae of the lack at· gunpowder, the Second 
Continental Congress, in October, 1175, recOmmended that the vari ... 
~UI states export provisions to the West Indies in order to obtain 
~ms and ammunition.1) 
A merchant at Campveere informed Yorke early in Ioiarch, 
~776, that a favorite way to take ammunition to the Americans was 
~o load tor the coast of Atrica but then to go to St. Eustat 1us, 
19 
~ere "their cargoes, being the most proper assortments, are 1n-
stantly bought up by the American agent8."1~ The high price ot 
powder proved a great temptation to the Dutch merchants. Jameson 
reports that 1n April, the profit on gunpowder at the island was 
one hundred and twenty per cent. l ; 
Lord Suffolk received a report trom a Rotterdam mer-
chant that powder which cost torty or forty-two florins a hundred-
weight in Holland sold tor two hundred and forty florins a hun-
dredweifpt at the island. This was sent disguised in tea-chests, 
rice ~barrela. and the like. The report continues, eighteen Dutch 
ships had gone out by ~AY with powder and ammunition for the 
American market.16 
Most ot the powder used by the American army 1n 1176 
came into its hands in this way. In May Yorke informed Eden that 
"St. Eustatius was the rendezvolJ,a or everything and everybody 
meant to be clandestinely conveyed to America. It was ea8Y to get 
oneself carried thither, and military adventurers ot all nations 
have congregated at the island."11 Holland and especially Amster-
dam remained the chlef source of supply. 
14- llWl· 
15 DJ&!., 681-688. 
16 lW., 6SS. 
17 ~., 688.669. 
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These underhand dealings did not go unnoticed by th$ 
British ambassa.dor. He urged increased activity on the part of 
the British cruisers, elicited resolutions from the States Gen-
eral's comrl1ittee of foreign affaira condemning such traffic, and 
urged the pensionary of Holland to do all that he could. Moreovex 
the Dutch constitution was so complicated and cumbersome that 
nothing could be accomplished. Large numbers of people were in-
terested in this trade, although most people supposedly condemned 
it. The city of Amsterdam was especially interested in it. Van 
Breckel. the pensionary of that city. constantly worked to thwart 
the British ambassador. 
When the Dutch prohibitions expired in autumn, the 
British government sent a memorial of protest to the States Gen-
eral. That governing body issued a pI~oclamation torbidding the 
exportation of warlike stores or ammunition to the revolted colo-
nies tar one year from October 10, 1176. Nothing much was ex-
pected from this proclamation. This is evident trom the fact 
that Suffolk 8ugeested that the amount of military stm~es sent to 
the Dutch West Indies should not be larger than the average export 
in the years before the war. and that the Dutch colonial govern-
ments be compelled to r,ive an account of their expenditure. Yorke 
suggested to Eden that, since the Dutch did not make the proper 
USe of the gunpowder they manufactured, they should not be allowed 
to take home any saltpetre. The trade, however, went on. At 
21 
intervals the trade did slacken because of the action ot the 
British cruisers, or because of the glad tidings from Long Island, ' 
or' bE<oause of overstocking by the Amsterdammers.18 
These satisfactions were short-lived. For instanee. a 
!British captain reports that he stopped a Dutch ship sailing home 
from the island to Flushing with one thousand seven hundred and 
fifty barrels of gunpowder. The Dutch sailing master admitted 
loIhat he had already sold seven hundred and fifty stands of arms 
and three thousand barrels of gunpowder at the :i.sland; but that he 
was taking the remainder home after 'Waiting sevell months to sell 
it. The British captain thought that he was going out beyond the 
range of British cruisers to meet a vessel to which he ~fo\lld traneo 
fer' his stocks. There was a vessel found sailing in the neighbor-
hood without cargo, the occupants of which eaid that they were 
CI'uising for pleasure.19 
In the middle of the year Johannes de Graatr. the secre-
\.Jary, repla.ced the governor ot the island, but he did no better. 
The port was opened wit.bout reserve to American ships. On Novem-
~er 5, 1776, Van BIbbsI' wrote to the Maryland councilor sa.f'ety 
~o urge them to send all their vessels to St .. Eustatius rather 
.1 .M. 
18 Ibid., 689-690. 
19 Ib:\1., 690. 
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than to any other island, "as the Dutch have discovered tha.t their 
l::lWS when put in force must ruin their !-terchants.. I am on the 
best terms with His Excellency, the Governor, and have his word 
and promise relative to some partiC\.u.ars that ~ives me great sat-
isfaction and puts much in our powers. I was not so happy taking 
the Com!:1and, but He are as well fixed "dth him no", as \Ie Wl~I'e with 
the former." Two weeks later he ~lrote: "Our Flag flys current 
evor'! day in the road. The :Merchants here are al\1ays complaining 
Ioi' Government until th(~y v'lOuld gi va as much Protection and Ind'ul-
~ence here to us as the French and Spaniards do... •• T'na Gover-
lor is daily expressing the greatest desire and intention to 
protect a tra.de with us here. Indeed they begin to discover their 
pustake and are noW very jealout3 of. the Frencht~ runnine away with 
~ll theil' trade. n2Q 
On I<iovember 16, 1776, an event occurred which brought 
~rit.iah resentrn~..nt to its highest point., A vessel of the new 
Pontinent,nl navy, .the t\n,drew ~q£i!f under Captain Isaiah Itob1nson. 
n.ying the nEnf flaf~ of thirteen stripes, anchored oft St. Eusta-
",ius, and_ a8,1uted Fort Orange with eleven guns; and the salute waa 
roetm'ned. This was thought to be the first time the A.'Ilerican flag 
~as saluted in a foreign port. However, on the preceding 
20 l~!d., 690-691. 
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october 21th, an unnamed American schooner on lenr...nG the Danish 
island of St. Croix with a small oargo of powder salut.ed the tort 
and ha.d the compliment retllrned. 21 
However, the affair at St. Eustat1us was .:iora notice-
able. The arrival and reception of the ~2K P~ii roused the 
indil.1lation of the president of St. Christopher. CorJmenti.ng very 
severely on the salute, and summing up the many Violations of 
neutrality he had observed trom his island, he sent the document 
to DeGraaf!. Simultaneously, he sent an ind1:"')1ant account to the 
secretary of state in London. In this account. President Great-
head commented severely on the open encouragement and protection 
which the rebel~ received at the Dutch !aland, and the constant 
equippin,?; and. fittine ... out of privateers to prey on British com ... 
m€Tce. He was especia.lly angered by.the incident of the sloop 
£}~,l tiamm;:e li..~r2, flying the flag of the Continental Congress, 
\Ihi eh, on t~ OVE~rr:b er 21 t almost \41. tf-J.n range of' the guns of Fort 
Orange, had t,aken a British brigantine and then returned to the 
road of St. Eustat1u8, with flag .flying, and there received every 
si(~n of aid and protection. 22 
21 i;Qiq". 691. 
22 X~~a.t 691-692. 
24 
As Lord aurfolk stated. tl~ greatest offense was the 
hunc;c paid a I'eb€.cl ~r1g&ntine c~:.:.rrying the flaG ;,)£ ttc rebel Con-
f,i'{;:;:SS. (l'hl::,~ governor's refly that he was trf'm- trow betraying any 
partiality 'bctv,;een Great :Brita.in and hel' North A;lleric"m colonies. 
was insolent and not to be overlo(.)ked. The secrct,,'1!'Y of stntc 
sent to 311' Joseph Yorke £:~ me;rrol'1al which hE: prenent;20.1 to the 
States GehtJral. After 2:1 ving an account of Dc Gruaff, IJ connivance 
at the ille,snl trade and th~ fitting..-out of privateers, and the 
out:cn;::e of ruturning the .i\.merican salu.te, the :ninistE.r d(;clal'cd 
th':'l t he Wtts ordered 
Uto expressly demand of your High flightiness fl forl'!l~l disa-
vowal of the auute by Fort Orange, at St. Eustatius t to the 
:1"€bel shiP. the disr.lission fmd immediate recall of Governor 
van Grad!, and to declare further, on the part of His Maj ... 
e~ty, that until sati:sfaction is given they arc n;;;t to expect 
that His f.1,ajosty will sutf'er himself" to be amused by more 
assurances. or that he will delay one inst311t to take such 
measl~es as ho2,hall think due to the interests and dignity ot his crown." J 
Appropriate :aeasur(:s had already been taken. The lords 
islands atation to post cruise;rs otf the road of' St. Lustatiua. 
search all Dutch ships tor ams, ammunition, clothing, and send 
violators to sow~ port of the Leeward Islands s to be detained 
-., • , '11 
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until turthr:I" orders; and thene injnnctions were to l)f'l mnintn.iI':;ed, 
• "" 24-for S:lX weE\< .. s '" 
The llnt.ch Republic could not resnnt the tone of the 
Enp.;l:ish me.nor;.als because of its comp15.cr .. ted. m.achin ":1"'Y' " In their 
rep1:" they disavowed their go,'ernor t s action [lnd ordercd h'.m to 
corlO 11011'1.(;'. to eX!1luin his actjions. PleadinG aee. fC"D." of seasick .... 
ness, and the recent illness of himself and his fcurr:tly, he ,1(15 
mor€! than a year eominr; home. In the meanwhile the s.3.lutea went 
on. Count Bylnndt, who S'l}cceeded DeGt-aatr in ':TIur:Lne zlw.tters, 
\"/~1tcl:ed~:lore closely over the execution of tho neutrality laws, 
a1tho~lgh he \IQS [lccuse .. 1 of treati.nr: the A.rnericans "n.th the same 
civil1.t}" as t,he cltize.ns of other nations. Tho- tEtnha.ss!J.dor W~i.S 
notified that the British \lOt:.ld not tci;:e any more Dutch ships 
~~less they had naval or warlike stores on board bconu~e St. 
Eustatius proved very usei'ul to the Windward Islands in time of 
Sc~city.25 
DeGraafi' reached bome in July, 177g. He presented this 
defense in Febr~~ry: 
He declared that he had never cormived at trade in .munitions 
of war; that the Ba:\timgre ~ had not been fitted out at 
the island but by the council in Maryland; that her prize 
was not made within range of his guna, but. much nearer to 
24 ~. 
25 11a1d., 694. 
-~i; ~;~!;;~p~:~~ ;~~~;~ =f!~t ~W~f l~~! tJn~ch~r:Ee h~;d by 
fired, that t:;.-~is 'W'D.S the usue..l return s~11ute to merch.:imt 
vessels, and implied no recognition of American independence; 
that on accvcati em by Vice-lui'l11ral Young ut;ainst ~/a.'1. Eibber, 
as concerned in fitting out privateers he had placed the 
·, .... :r .. iv,-"l ~.,fJ/ .~ d"','<'\r>,"'d bac'<·c;~ bt~ ""' ..... 0 ... 0·'" '~~('~.4 ... ~r'i*"" 1''''A-;'' ;t h"'d 
'\.40 Q.~ • ...,;J.. ~1. C~'l~&' ~ j., .. > '.-, J ~ ......... t;..tt ...... ~~.4w ........ v..... ""'.~W..lo .,~t;4. 
been his custom to require incoming AInerican vessels to g1 ve 
~Jonds for due observa.nce of: neutroJ.ity while in::'ho POI"t; 
that he had compelled all persons on the island posseusing 
~., ·n~)c··'·""'r.'" t f'\ +-,~ 1, .. L"" 0" +.ll .... , .. '~t .• l-. "''''r "0 "l;~ 110"- €lv'~. ",.'- ,~ t to Nor'·" 
.:;."-",,, ! ~''''~:'''J. ."vi VUAlr.<;,.;.i {,;,_ vI ".t!,j.(';';.' t.",,;'\:;:.j \f L,-~\.:~ v ...,1,0.1-""'.;;.. iJ Ji,. , :.~ 
America; that he had appointed a customs olerk visitor or 
shii;S in or <1e:1':' to flnJ. arlit3 1f any were 1::"'1e..::;a11] car:cied. 26 
Bl':~.ish. comr~iaJ:ldt.1n.l t,hnn against the rJ1.1tch. .DeGraafi' was again 
ap:Jc,~nted g:>vernor. ,'llld his actions 'l.iet'o so accaptablc to t.he 
Arnel'ic:ms that t\iO privateers ri€J.re lldI;H;d uftel' h1J;;. and hls lady.2? 
A neutrality which tla;':; so cotn;>lc'tcly satisfactory one belligerent 
and so unacceptablsa to the otht:l" could not haVE; been p·:;;rfect. 2S 
In the spring ot 1780, when Sir George Rodney arrived 
to tw):e COmI"'...and of the British fleet. 1n the '_Jest Indies, the situ-
ation WB.S 8til1 '1ery st.rai.neu. Aft.Elr an unsl.lceessful battle With 
GuiGhen off :t<at"'t.i.rdque, April 17. 1780, rtodne~r declarod that two 
26 loid., 694-695. 
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vesHe1s sa.iled trOT.1 St. Eustrrtius, loaded with nav::tl stores and 
~nd filled with carpenters. These ves:3els joined the 
Fren<:;}l fleet, and, bOCatw0 of t}-\eir help. eieht French vessels, 
fleet.. 29 Rodney seems to hnve conce! ved a deep £'f>e1in[: of hos-
H~ la~er lV'rote, "Thi:':'! rod~ nf only su 
miles :1.n. len.cth and. three ~.n breadth, had done Enr).tilld More hal"'r.'l 
thar: n11 the arms nf her ':lOst potnnt enemies, and ::110116 Su.y)Ilorted 
the :!.::tf'u,,,,:;ouse 1\.me::'1 can ~"cbel1ion. ,,)0 
Bjr this time the unr had become. a I~uropcan one as \mll. 
Becn.l~.se the Dut ch had tc'oorne thfJ chief nelltraJ. carl'ior-s in the 
Unitpd States, nnd also because of the d5.spute over t.1H1 doctrine 
01 .; free ships :nak'3 free L1'()ods n t the feeling betlfecm -Sneland and 
Holland was bccot.'1:ing worse and worse. At thia tune the nOl"thm.'n 
EUl"O})f;;\Ull pO\ferS were uni tinf£ against En;;land in the i\rmod Neu-
trality oi' 17$0. The Dutch 1fol!.ld ?robably El3roe. If t:.he breaJ~ 
with the Dutch cmt1e, all the northern po~n's \:auld unite in a 
COlliiilon caus'! against E:ng;!.and. A pretext for start,ing a war with 
29 f1undYi 
Aruilil'aJ.. Lord itodn~IJ 
30 Ibid 
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the Dutch came with the discovery of a proposed Dutch-American 
treaty among the papers or Henry Laurens, when he was captured 
bY the British. The draft was signed only by an aeent of Congress 
and an agent or the c1ty of Amsterdam. Sir Joseph Yorke. in two 
memorials presented to the States General, demanded a tormal re-
pudiation ot the conduct ot the Amsterdam magistrates. The tone 
was 80 threatening that insurance to St. Euetatius rose to twenty 
or twenty-five per cent. 
The repudiation was promptly sent, but. because or the 
Dutcll constitution, it was difficult tor the States General to 
punish the offiCials of one particular city. Their reply was un-
satisfactory', and on December 20, 1780, England declared war on 
the Netherlands. Unable to prepare rapidly for war, Holland be-
came an easy prey. In tact, beiore Yorke left The Hague two 
hundred Dutch ships, with cargoes valued at fifteen million flor-
ins, were seized.)l 
Even before his first memorial Yorke eaw the advantages 
of taking the Dutch colonies in America. Their loss would affect 
the Netherlands the most, would stop the rebels' trade and sup-
plies, would close a channel or correspondence and connection with 
• 
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North America. The British could use St. Eustatius as a depot 
till satistnct10n is given tor the past, and security for the 
future. 32 Yorke ureed immediate action beoause he had heard that 
ten or eleven Dutch men-of-war were preparing to sail tor the 
West Indies. 
\ihen Yorke's letter relating to 3t. Eustatius 'Was re-
ferred to the admiralty, Stormont informed Yorke on December 5, 
that he was preparing Uto send secret orders to seize the Dutch 
settlements in the West Indies.")) Orders to conquer the Dutch 
islands. beginning with St. Eustatius and St. }<lartin, were sent 
to Rodney and to l<1ajor-General Vaughn, the commander ot British 
land farces in the West Indies, on the day that war was declared. 
Lord Stormont also declared that tfhe was persuaded, upon best in-
tormation, that we should never have been in our present situati~ 
~ere it our good fortune that St. EU8tatius had been destroyed or 
sunk in the ocean.-3i 
Rodney arrived at Barbados on December 6. Rear-Admiral 
Sir Samuel Hood joined him before the end of the year. About the 
middle of January, Rodney made his useless attack upon St. 
Vincent. He rece! ved the declaration of war and his secret orders 
32 .~,g .. 697-698. 
)3 ~., 698. 
34 1;lai51. 
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on the 27th of January, sailed from St. Lucia, after embarking 
Vaughn's troops, on the 30th. On February 3, he appeared before 
St. Eustatius and demanded the instant surrender or the island 
and all that it contained.); 
There was no possibility or defenau~, 80 Qovernor De-
Graaf! surrendered unconditionally in an hour. Count Frederick 
van Bylandt. commander of the lone Dutch frigate, atter tiring 
two broadatdea for his honorIs sake, also surrendered. A large 
body of American sailors, atter a show ot resistance. were forced 
to surrender because of hunger and Vaughn's troops. A detachment 
of British troops captured the islands of St. Martin and Saba. 
The Dutch flag was kept flying over the town and tort 80 that 
Dutch, French, Spanish. and American ship" might be decoyed into 
the harbor and se1z·ed aa the spoils of war. 36 
Rodney, surprised at the stores ot materials, wrote to 
his wite, "The riches of St. Euatatius are beyond all comprehen-
sion. • •• All the magazines and store-houses ar.8 tilled, and 
. 
even the beach is covered with tobacco and sugar. "37 8.y March 26. 
the admiral reported that about t1f"ty American vessels, loaded 
with tobacco, had been captured. According to Lord George 
3 5 . Mundy. 1h.f! lJhl iWl QQFre:u?oqdenql gt: !Ja ~ 
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~rmain, 'the island was a vast magazine of all kinds of military 
,tores • ' Although Rodney had been told that there was none to be 
~d, several thousand tou ot cordage were round., Some authori-
ties estimated the value of the capture at more than three milliol'l 
pounds sterling.' The admiral wrote to h1s wife, with understanda-
ble pride, that "There never was a more important stroke made 
against any state whatever."3S 
John Adams, who was in Holland at the time. in a letter 
to secretary LiVingston, reports the reaction ot the Dutch people 
to this disaster.' 
You can have no ideal sir, no man who was not upon the spot 
can have any idea, or the gloom and terror that was spread 
by this ',event. The creatures of the court openly rejoiced 
in th~s. and threatened, some ot them in the most impudent 
terms. I had certain information that some or them talked 
high of their expectati ons of popular insurrections against 
th~ burgomasters or Amsterdam and M. VanBreckeli and did 
I;lr. Adame the honor to mention him"l~s one that was to be 
hanged by the mob in such company.''''';:1 
There was great exultation in England. Government stocks rose 
one and one-half per cent. Lady Rodney wrote to her husband: 
Your express arrived on the morning ot the 13th (£'!arch). My 
houae ~s been like a fair trom that time till this. Every 
friend, every acquaintance came. I went to the draWing-
room on 'l'bursday following. It was more crowded than on a 
birthday; and the spirits which every one was in were 
3g 1l11!l., 701. 
39 6~'s&' 
32 
enlivening to a degree. and the attention and notice Ire. 
ceived from their Majesties was sU£ficient to turn my poor 
brain. • •• This glorious news has been a thunderbolt to 
the opposition, very few ot whom appeared in the Houee ot 
Commons. Ne~otlations towards peace had been talked of tor 
some time be ore its arrival'J.and it cannot fail to produce 
a favorable etfect upon them.~ 
As a reward tor what he had done, Rodney was raised to the peera~ 
and was ~ven an annual pension of two thousand pounds.41 
What would Uodney and Vaughn do with their great prize? 
Rodney left no doubt as to his opinion of the island when he 
called it: 
A nest ot v~per8, a nest of villains; they deserve scourging 
and they shall· be scourged. • •• An asylum for men guilty 
ot every crime, and a receptacle tor the outcast ot every 
nation; men who will make no scruple to propagate every 
falsehood the~r debased minds can invent. \19 thought that 
this ne,t of emuge].ers, adventurers, betrayers of their 
country t and' rebels to their k:1ng, had no right to expect a 
capitulation, or to be treated as a re8pectabl~)eOPle J 
their atrocious deeds deserve none, and they 0 t to nave 
known. that the just venge.anee ot an injured emp re J though 
slow, is sure. 
He wanted to leave the island, "inste~d of the greatest emporium 
on earth, a mere desert, and only known by report. "42 
His anger was greatest against the British merchants ot the 1s-
land, partioularly those who became Dutch citizens in order to 
40 Mundy, DS2 ~ iD.ft Cgrrg§pondi!lS! 9! tnt; ~ 
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carryon the illegal trade. In tact, Rodney doubted the patriot-
ism ot most of the British who lived in the West Indies. 
lia desire tor personal gain \,lSS ming,led with hi. right-
eousness. His earliest letters etate that all 1a the King's and 
he i8 entitled to nothing. 43 Three days later he sends to the 
admiralty this request J "It His I>1ajesty is graciously pleased to 
bestow any part of the spoil between the navy and army, he w111 
dictate in what manner his gracious bounty may be be.towed, that 
all altercations and disagreements may be prevented between" the 
two serv1ces.44 
Started in the spirit of anger, Rodney's measures were 
very comprehensive, He ordered that all the inhabitants or St. 
Eustatiu8 were to be considered prisoners ot war, and that all 
property was to be confiscated tor the King. Burke branded 
Rodneyfs action as; 
a general confiscation ot all the property found upon the 
island. public and pr1vate t Dutch and British, without dis-
crimination, without regard to lriend or toe. to the subject. 
of neutral powers! or the subjects ot our own state; the 
wealth or the opu ent, the goods ot the merchant, the uten-
sils of the artisan, the necessaries of the poor, were seized 
43 ~., II, 1), 16. 
44 ~., II, 21 
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on, and a sentence ot general begGary pronounced in one 
moment upon a whole people. 45 
The admiral's other orders were equally drastic. There 
should be no plundering; no one, not even the officers, was to go 
ashore; the English inhabitants ot the Leeward Islands were 
ordered to stay away trom the island; all naval stores were to be 
lent to the government shipyard.e at Antigua; supplies intended 
tor St. Domingo should be sent to Jamaica; all goode sent from 
Europe should be sold publicly tor the King; all goods produced 
in the West Indies and in Amari oa were to be sent in convoy to 
Eneland; the "lower town" should be dest.royed or unroofed, and 
the materials sent to Barbados. St. Lucia, and Antigua. 46 Oommu-
nication with the Windward Islands unde.r flaf~ of truce was £or-
biddon.41 
The execution of these orders caused much hardship. 
Prisoners ot war were at the mercy of the admiral. Samuel Ourzon, 
an agent of Congress, and Isaac Gouveneur. Jr... his partner. were 
lent to FAlgland as prisoners of war. They were convicted ot 
treason, but~ after serving only thirteen months, they 'fere 
70j. 45 Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the Amerioan Revolution,-
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released by the Rockingham ministl"Y. 4' The French merchanta were 
treated better than the others. They were sent to ~~tin1que 
and to Guadeloupe f and were a.llowed to take with then their house-
hold furniture, plate, linen, and even their slaves. The gover-
nor, the Dutch. American, Bermudian, and British merchants were tCi 
be permitted or forced to retire, taking their household goods 
~ th them. The sugar .... planters were the only ones to be treated 
with favor. 49 
Since most ot Europe was either at war tlith F~gland or 
sympathized with her enemies, the devastation of St. Eustatius 
aroused a storm of protest. In London the merchants ot the \'1est 
49 ~., 11,.32, 44-46. 
. 1aiiiison, "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," 
704-705, states that ths"execution of these decrees caused much 
~ardship. Warehouses were locked, and merchants were denied 
permission to take inventories. All of their books and papers 
!were seized, and their cash was taken from them. The captain ot 
a Dutch supercargo, in a sort of diary, gives a vivid picture at 
the searchings of -portmanteaus and pockets, the dif~l~ng in gardens 
for hidden specie, the destruction of houses, the seizing of 
Inegroes; the appropriation of riding horses by the officers, and 
~he daily work ot shipping goods and. sending away the inhabitants 
in cqmpan1es, llc'ltion by nation. Rodney treated the warnings of 
the assembly of St. Christopher with contempt. 
The Jews were the most severely punished. They were 
deprived of their property, banished without their wives and 
children, and given only one day's notice. One hundred and one ot 
~hem were confined in a weighbouse and strip~d or their clothing 
W!11eh was ripped and the linings were searched. TheBri tish 
obtained eight thousand pounds sterling in this way. 
36 
India Company presented a useless petition to the Crown. The 
AmSterdam merchants sent a protest. It also became the subject 
of debate in the House of Cotilnlons during the month ot J';tay, 1781. 
'!'he debate war; reopened in December when Rodney and Vaughn, who 
",ere members of the House, were able to be present at an inquiry 
into their conduct. Edmund Burke led the opposition. He argued 
that Uodneyt s confiscation of private property was illegal and 
!Without precedent, and that the inhabitants, entitled to royal 
protection, could not all be punished for the crimes ot the few. 
~oreover, the properties were sold at auction at tar less than 
their value. 50 
More important to his professional career was the accu-
sation that Rodney, excited by the tremendous value of his prize, 
stayed at St. Eustatius eagerly supervising the disposal of the 
_poil and in this way lost the chance of important naval successes 
pffered him by the temporary weakness ot the allies in the Carib-
~ean. vlhile he was spending more than three months at the island, 
pe Grasse slipped around Martinique, watched only by Hood's squad-
ron, and jOined the rest of the French fleet off Fort Royal. It 
this juncture of the French had not been accomplished, the battle 
or Yorktown would never have happened. It Rodney had been to the 
windward ot Martinique, where Uood wanted him to be, the juncture 
705. 
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of the French fleet would not have occurred. 51 Thus, St. Eusta-
tiUB and its supplies, before and after its capture, was of 
great positive and indirect aid. 52 
Atter careful preparation, a large neet of thirty 
merchantmen was sent to England with the mas t valuable part ot 
the spoils, Wlder convoy of Commodore Hotham. A french admiral, 
LaMothe Piquet, attacked the convoy about twenty leagues west of 
Sci11y Islands. Hotham ordered the convoy to disperse and save 
themselves and the warships to draw oloa.... The French, instead 
• 
51 ~., 706.707. 
52 Ibid., 707. Although Lord North's majority might 
stop a Parliamentary inquiry, it could not halt legal proceedines. 
There appeared in the courts no less than sixty-tour claims, 
amounting to more than the value of the property. Rodney was 
put to a great deal of expense. The books and papers could not 
be found. In the six years follOwing the capture only thirteen 
cases were settled and judgments of restitution were handed 
down in nine of these cases. Because the King had granted all 
ot the spoils to the captors, Rodney and Vaughn should each have 
received a sixteenth of the spoils. Vaughn, however, told the 
House ot Commons that he had made nothing by the transaction. 
and Rodney did no better. They made conflicting arrangements 
which angered their captains and retarded the settlement. 
of fighting, made after the convoy and captured twenty-six of 
them. The warships and only eip-)1t of the merchnntsships suc-
ceeded in reachine Berehaven Bay.53 
St. Eustatius was taken by the French before the end of 
the year. The chief French merchant of the island and Marquis 
de Bouille plarmed the recapture of the island. At an Wlguarded 
part of the coast, the marquis, governor oi Martinique, landed a 
force of fourteen hundred men and quickly overcame the six hun-
dred and twenty-eight men commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cock-
burn. In 1783 it was brought out at Cockburn's trial that, al-
though he had been offered reeintorcements, he had refused them; 
and, even though he had been warned of the French attack two 
days before, he had ignored the information. Rodney's money, 
instead of being sent to England, was confiscated and detained 
because of the mismanagement of his agents. Jameson sums up 
Rodney's career in these words: 
The conquest on which he had prided himself as tthe greatest 
blow that Holland and America ever received' ended in dis-
appointment and vexation for him,-reversal and odium for his 
cOWltry. But it was left for him, by the memorable victory 
53 Ib~!., 707-708. Jameson and Randolph G. Adan~, 
"A View of'CornwQ lis's Surrender at Yorktown," Aro@ricgn H1§tori-
cat Revilri' New York, 1915, 33, disagree on the number of ships 
sent by . odney to En,sland. Since Adams's article is based on 
Rodneyls own record, we have used his figures. 
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of thE) twelf. th of APril.. 1782 t to show that» despite m1stakee 
of public policy and £!!itlts 01- private character, he pos-
sessed a prOfE'3Ssional greatness that cQ..y,ld lift n1s narne to 
beight ot e10ry as a naval commander. ,_ 
The story ot St. l;uetatiua has beell told in some detail 
Ibeclluse its contribution to the success ot the Battle o£ Yorktown 
_eems to < wnrrnnt it. It ILodnoy had not been occupied with his 
~onquest. he prot),'~bly would have intercepted tho French fleet. 
~1thout the support ot this fleat t'lllshington could never have baon 
~uccessrul in his siege ot l'orlctoWll. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF THE FREI'iCH 'JEST INDIES IN DETmUUHING 
'REHCB POLICY, 1775-1781 
Haiti, too, played an important part in the Revolution-
ary \i,:ar. .The tear of losing it and other islands in tl"e West 
Indies helped to brine France into the war as an ally ot the re-
volting colonies. It was through Haiti that French aid came to 
the r\meri cans. 
The history ot Santo Domingo and Haiti has been greatly 
influenced by geography and climate. On December 6, 1492, Oolum-
~us discovered the islend during his first voyage and named it 
Hispaniola. Except for Cuba, Haiti. the western end of this 1s-
~and. 1. closer to the United States than any other 0.£ the Carlb-
~ean lands. Mole St. Nioolas 11 located on a peninsula tihleh jut. 
out into the Windward Passage, one ot the most important ot the 
world's trade route.. Permanentrealdence by white men haa been 
made difficult because ot its tropical climate. However, it has 
been made a leading producer ot subtropical products because ot 
that same climate.. The importation of slave laborers, used by 
41 
the white colonial settlers to exploit its resources, was to make 
the history of this part of the islanddirterent from any other 
uropean colony.l 
The tirst permanent settlements were made in the south-
eastern part of the island. Englishmen. Frenchmen, Spaniards, 
d others fought for land and booty in the western third, Haiti, 
ich soon became an international frontier. Slowly the French 
irates gained enough control to have Spain. by the Troaty of 
, , 
yswick in 1697, recognize Prench sovereign1ty over a vaguely 
efined western third. For the sake of clarity and accuracy, th1s 
study will refer to the part controlled by France as Saint Domin-
In the trade wars ot the mercnntil1stic a,;e Saint Domin-
e gradually became the prize possession. The Yrench mini.ster to 
Ossun. in a memoir dated Febr~~y 10, 1174, declared: "It 
Domingue) is the finest and tichest colony that remains to 
the inconsiderable losses that they sustained in 
America; and it is their principal resource for t.he maintenance 
f a navy that becomes more necessary every day to counterbalance 
he formidable power of the English. ft 2 to Ulustrate the 
2 ~., 2. 
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importance of this trade, Logan states; 
o On the eve of the French Revolution Saint Domingue ex. 
ported to Franee commodities valued at two hundred and five 
millions of livres in the currenOJ' of Saint Domingue and 
imported trom France articles valued at'sixty-nine millions. 
In this lucrative trade were employed 1,282 ships ot three 
hundred and 8ixty-~ee thousand tons, manned by fifteen 
thousa.'1d sailora. In addition, trade between the colony 
and the United States had become so important tp~t many 
French chambers of COtmllerCe were protesting aeainst it • .3 
If Saint Domingue were threatened t Spain would also be 
concerned since she was bound by the Family Compact to come to thE 
~id of France in case of war, nnd was to share any losses which 
lIrould occur e.$ a result of war. Spaints L-nmense Amol"ican empire, 
lincluding Santo Domingo on the same island as Sa.int Doraingue. 
pfi:ered a strong temptation to the enemy t who wou1_d proba.bly be 
Ox-ea.t Britain, if Spain went to war to support Frar!ce.4 
British'policy in the Caribbean encouraged this fear of 
~ possible British attack on Saint Dom1ngt.:us. Having taken Jamaica 
JJl 1655, the British sought to captur~ Hispaniola under Crolnwell. 
nstl"uctlons were sent to the Britian gov61~llor of JWfla1ca. during 
he \lar ot the Spaniah Succession to encourage Santo Domingo to 
~ive the Frenell out of Sa.int Dorn1ngue. The captur'e ot St. Louis 
n the southern coast, in l748, was the only British attempt at 
:3 ~., 2-3. 
4 ;tRig.. 4,-,. 
-~"::SiOll after the French had a.cquired possession of their part 
pi the island.· However, British diplomacy gave serious considera-
~ion to Sa.int Domingue throug;hout the eiehteenth century.; As 
~arly as 1738 some British statesmen began to realize the imP01"t-
ance of the Wind\v-ard Pass&t~e, bet\1Sen Cuba and Sai.i. t Domingue. to 
~ritish commerce with Jamaica and Portobelo. By the end of the 
~ighteenth century Mole St. Nicolas came to be called the "Gib ... 
rnltC.J:" of the Caribbean." Finally. SUBer from Sa.int Domingue was 
~he principal competitor with that commodity from the British 
BUCi.Lr islands. By the end of the Seven Year t s viar there was a 
"trong tradition in the French foreign office that in future wars 
.... he Brit1eh would surely attack Saint Domingue. 6 
This island became a troublesome region l'lhich British, 
Spanish, and French would have t.o consider carefully in their war 
plans. It was more than a potential danger spot to the Thirteen 
Colonies. It was a source of impCll"'tant trade. 
The contacts between the English colonies in North 
lmeri cs and Saint DOmingue began when William Phip$ recovered a 
pirate treasure otf the coast of the island as early as 1686-1687. 
-In 1'717 the French govermnent, l"'ccotPlizing their comm()ricaJ. l..t').ter-
dependance, and in spite of the mercantilistic theory, authol"'i6ed 
a tl"ade that consisted largely ot an e.xcheJlge of N~\1 England fish 
tor molasses from Saint DOtid.ngue.7 Soon thEU",3 were sixty-tl1ree 
distilleriee in the Massachu.setts Colony alonl, for the mallut<S.c-
ture of molasses into rum. D"'ur1ng the next ten years t~:~e rJ04:'th 
Americans had $!1ugt;led so :nany unauthorized articles into Suint 
DO::J.il<.:ue ttlE.t Fra.nce cOPlplained to Great Britain. By the Molasse. 
IAct of 1733 the British hoped to levy such high duties on molneses 
Irro!:: the French "lest Indies that the colonists \-TO d find it more 
IProfitable to trade with the British islande. g The t\'10 mother 
~ov.ntri {?'$ could not put a stop to the amuer.11ng and contre,band 
~rade even 'When they ~'cre at war because both the dil'ect and tri ... 
P-ncu.1ar trade had rcaded such proportions. 
The attention of the three comnlercial pOiscrs and of the 
~irteen Oolonies wns focused upon Sn1~t Domingue at the outbreak 
p! the American Revolution. jn order to prevent an. attack on 
~nir:lt Domingue and at.her French possessions, many CO[1petent h1ato-
r-ians conclude. France secretly Etided the colonies end eventually 
7 Samuel· I. Morison, lbi t'lKilCiM Hil1io[Y 9l. l-li@IICbij-
l~ttsJ Boaton, 1921, 19. 
e Pares. 1E. .f!Wi Tta9a .m l£lul ~ ,nsl&el, 1739-176)>> 
s:i.,g;ned the Treaty of Al1:f.a."1ce, a.l1,d a Treaty of Amity and Trade of 
177!~ vJ'ith the United States. 9 This point is disputed, howe\"e~. ~ 
by equn.lly cmppetent historlans. L.eti us exu.'11:i.ne, first. the 0PPOI-
1ne poin'ts of view i,n the controversy; second. Lo;~m' sconclusione , 
bnsed on nEhl mat€lrials; t4"1d third. the e.xtent of aid through 
10 Salnt Domingue. 
Van 'lYtle o£fc);~$ evidence to eOO1;{ trlG.t Fr,'.nce aided the 
col'Juies and aiti.T,ed t.he alliance 'i;dth the United 3t.::.tes bec~;..u:f;e 
of fear of an, t.tte.ck on the French lJest Indies. As early as 
1.76!",) some colonists want ('d to conquer Saint Dominque as an out ... 
let for their produ.cts I accox'tiing to Po,ntlcToy, 9. French observer 
l.r. the Am€~rj.can colonies. In 1763, another' French Ob::$f::ryer, De 
Kalb, "'JaS conv:i.nced that the Arnericru1 Colonies would join thE; 
n d $ 
9 'Lora~ The P1:o1omat1c I.!,~lat~o.£A .Ql t}1C t:nit,qp. e~9r1t,§1 
iD.4. H,eJtci, AZZ6-.l,bl. ;"1. 
10 Sources consulted tor this dispute include: 
Samuel FlaCG' Bemesl :.t'hf(. D&n&o!'Z\t'lCV .2t t,11£ AIDeticm Revolutlgl1. 11ew York, 19J5, ·19-20. 
Edward S,* Corwin. [LeUgh PolicX .m.u! ~ ger&;. 
~lignC6 of ~. Princeton, 1916. 
Edward 5. Corwin, "TriO French' Objective in the Amer -
can Revolution, If A!ner!cN.\ H&lxQ£&S;&1, Heviax, New York, 1916, XXI, 
33-62. 
Clau,de H. Van Tyne, Iflntluences Which Determined 
the French Government to Make the Treaty with America in 1778," 
Amel'lc§Jl !I~,tor1ceJ· i~Itm:h New York, 1916, XXI, 52$-541. 
Iilothc,l;' country in an c1',t'ort to capture the li'l--{'!nch ~est Indies 
should France attack Great Britain.iergennss, l''reneh minister 
of ft1l4 sign affairs, and Louis XVI recorded their fears of a 
I3ritish attack on the l"l'ench ~iest Inc!ies. Caron de Jeat:.marchais, 
whose z'ole in aiding thE:~ colonies will be; discussed later, either 
on hia own initiative or prompted by Arthur l.oe, an ;\.merican 
ageut, ill l'175 began to :nag Vergelmes vlth this refrain: if~~e 
ww;t. aid tLc Americans or they wd.ll be reconciled with ili'eat 
I3~.'itain and att&ck the French ~",€st Indies. ttll The ,i:WJlle idea was 
.:i,l;';'if;.;>::£tcd. by the;: L:in1~tet' of l1:·us:.;ia to F'l'ance. Lord Stol"'mont, 
th.e British ambascadol" to li'rance, was told by VCl1 gel1lA.eS in Au-
bust of 1777; nyour pt.;,blic p~pcrs. your pw~p,hlGteers, YOl:X 
Ol~a:tors and ours. 4."'epc~t cea.scleasly that if you de not I'egain 
your color:.it:~s J you \-dll fall l.lpon OlJ .. r03. ,,12 
In ord~r to prevent reconcilliation and jl')int attack on 
tho l;'rencc possessions in the Caribberm. Vergennes pushed the 
A.'nerican al11anc(; a!tCl' tr~ Briti$h considered a peace offe!' to 
the colonies follo'td.nf; the battle of Saratoga. The Anwrican 
ao·n::.te in Paris w{;:ce rCi;ortcdly carrying on secret :.tegotiations 
-
11 .Lopan" ~ liicpl2Mt&e Ba1AAiQDI 9J: the Uni1(iQ States ~ H§iti. 1'Z26-.a2.,T. . 
12 I1215!., s. 
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\'1ith British agents. The Americans cleverly kept the fires burn-
ing under Vergennes. The French foreign minister wrote to Ossun. 
the ambassador to Spain on December 27, 1777; "The question whidl 
we may have to solve is to know whether it is more expedient to 
ba.ve war aeainst England and America unit.ed, or w:i.th AT/lerlea for 
us aga1aat England."l) Van Tyne observes that Vergennes and 
other 1rench statesmen recog;nized in the American Revolution an 
opportunity to weaken Great Britain and restore France to a dom!. 
nant position in world affaireh However. he 18 convinced t.hat 
France aided the colonies and signed the alliance with the United 
States 1n order to prevent a.n att,ack on the French West Indles.14 
On the other hand, Corwin, largely on the same evIdence 
consulted by Van Tyne, entirely rejects the latter's conclusions. 
lie points out that Vergennes in order to win unw111inB statesmen 
to b.:\a vi ewe would naturally use the argument of tear. Corwin 
further states that Great Britain had not attacked French and 
Spanish pesseasions in 1715 when the fleets ot Brance and Spain 
were weak. Since the Bourbon fleets were ready in 1778, why 
should they tear a British attack? In 1115 the British opposi-




-argued that the danger came from the government of Lord North in 
17"/8. In 1775 Vergennes ar€:~ed that the bait of a joint attack 
on the French West Indies might have deterred the Arllerican colo-
nists f"".t'om revolution. In 1778 the argument had COf,H~ to rest on 
the danger of the reconcUiation of the United Stntea and Great 
Britain. Corwin wonders if the Ar.lericans would have accepted the 
opportunity tor spoils in 1171-1778 1t Great Britain did not oft~ 
complete independenc'e. Probably not, and. in Corwin's op1n!on, 
Great Britain was not ready to otfer complete independence at 
that time. From reports sent by Noailles, the French ambassador 
to London, Vergennes knew that there was little likelihood of a 
settlement. Moreover, Vergennes insisted that the Spanish '~ie8t 
Indies were in graver danger than were the French. Corwin con-
cludes that Vergennes's COnCel"ll "was not, primarily, the security 
ot the West Indies_ttl) 
Some or Corwin's arguments are open to criticism. An 
at tack on the F'rench West Indies could have been good bait to 
prevent the revolution in 1775 and would have been equally good 
bait to bring about a reoonciliation in 1778. Second, it was not 
at all strange to see the arguments formerly advanced by the op-
position adopted by the party in power. 
-
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In the opinion of those who support the Corwin theory. 
eOl1clusi ve argument 't.Jas the fact that Vergennes knew 
ere was no danger of a British attack in 1777. Arter the 
tailt!ro ot Forth, a seoret British ar:ent, Lord Stormont, on Sep-
tember 2, 1777, offered to VergenneS a guarantee that i.f France 
did not s£.nd troop. to her West Indies, Great Britain \iould not 
,end troops to her Caribbean possessions. Corwin rails to record. 
the reaction of French statesmen to this proposal. Maurepas and 
Louis XVI agreed with Vergennes tr~t this proposal could not be 
accepted. ' Stormont could not hide his disappointment at not bein 
able to get an agreement that Wltld ha.v~ given his court an ad-
vantage over the French which they would certainly have abused, 
hen he received the !trench refusal.. Vergennes alao told Storaoa 
,.: 
that, 1£ she wanted tOt Great Britain could send shipe and troops 
. ).,;..."' 
to th'fi';'iWest Indies but, he, recommended, they shOUld stay out of 
the waters of the French colonies. On September 6. 1771, Ver..,. 
gennas wrote Noal11as that France :intended to exercise her right 
to send troops to the French ~est Indies tor defensive purposes 
only. 16 
Two weeke later in a letter written to Ossun, Vergennes 
passed judgment upon the BrItish course of action. According to 
Vergennes, the British were really tryine to intimidate France 80 
-
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that they could prove to the Americans that they could not rely 
upon France in a time of crisis. lie instructed Nos1lles in 
rather warlike tones to inform Weymouth that the French fleet 
would leave tor the French ~~est Indies in about a weok. France 
recognized Great Britain's ri~lt to increase her West Indies 
fleet in proportions. Statesmen or the eighteenth century did 
not place faith in the official assurances of a rival nation. 1£ 
he rUld ~ccepted the pledge or any other nation at face value. 
Vergennes would have very naive indeed.1? 
Logan has examined t:118 question at some length because 
it has been Olle ot the major controvDrsles in Amer-ic.'Ul diplomat.ic 
history. It l'10cld seem that later American historians have sup ... 
ported the Corwin theory. He has reopened the case because of 
some new materials which, combim~d with his m~1'l reading of th~ twc 
pr:l.llcipal sources used by other writers. shed new light on the 
problem but which do not completely solve it. 
The new materials used by Lor,an are, fir3t, the ne~otla. 
ttons between France and Spain to settle the boundary between 
Saint Domingue and Santo Domingo and certain difficulties which 
arose during the period 1770-1771; second, t.he correspondence 
-
17 Ibip., 10. 
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bct','iOC?n Vercennes a'1d Count DtEnnery, the g()~lernor-r,;eneral or 
S~_iL t JominClc 1.n 1775 and 1776.18 
In AU,:ust, 1773, ntl\1~~tdllon, at tht'!.t tiMe the French 
rm:'eiL~ minister, wrote to Ossun that FJ:'>ance had to e:cercise 
pn.:cttcular ~are in p1).ttin~= Saint DorZ!inG'1lG in n. state o.r: defense 
in Ci.::.se of vu?:x with Great Britain. He did net say 'tvhy war migh.t 
BCCat~le French m.ilitary (~Xpert8 
celiille as a necessaI',r pl"'Gcaution. a.;airist possible 3I'itish At tack 
In Februa."l, 1174, he declared that. it. ~as a.bsolutely necessary 
for Fcance to pass i''::'Oril une anti oi.' the isl&tld to t;.he othtJ!' ill caSE 
of a Bl."itiah attack. He also suggestcJd that the !;,l.k.iliish part of 
the island w()"l.ud surely fall into Bl~:l.tiah hands wit.hout JTl'cnch 
aid. H.e argued that. since the British attack had be~n planned. 
dur'ingthe Seven Years' iiar I the pz'oJect 'Would m01'0 tihan likely 
be l.'anewed. It. therefore .. became lleceseury for thQ two Bourbon 
houses to settle their difficulties in the ialand.19 
-
18 1,91..9,_, lO-U. 
19 It!19.. ll. 
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fear.' of H. Bt'lt:lsh attacl: h11Em he told VerGennos thnt 
plenty or tiutG to prepare for one. Dc A::,"~::.n(b. ta:m:tted 
for J ... ouiaiana to the partition of roland in 1772. n()W'~nrer. 
no inccllvenience in pe!'!:1ittiug Frunch troops to pass 
0:' a lir!. tioh 
of the Dcvcn:l key {;.t"' her 
ontended tiAktt.. since Frauce was only inter~sted in CO~i!l;.":;.cce and 
gricu.ltw'e. e~rt,.,ensive fOl·t.i£icut~.ona 'Wtlre n.ot neeu.t.d. In case ot 
\A:'eat Britain. VerGGnnes io.aiated, on Ja.r~uary 10. 1775, 
poauession of Fort Daupltin by t..he F'~"ench W&3 absolutely 
ecessary. However, it. seems cleal'" t.hat he was thinking only of 
eventual war. Vergennes' desire to keep the kno.iledge of Sour-
from Great Britain may have been the ri.;sult of 
rather the>l1 an imrnediate attack by th~ &"itish in 
Caribbean. LoJ9,1.n sums up this correspondence in thi~ llay: 
lji:lt} whole, this oorrespondence lett the irnpresoion that there 
no real alnrm. on the pa.;a;"t of either France or Spain. Ind.eod, 
the documents sU.Et;~e3t ratiher that both side. were willing to 
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resort to any argUl'l'umt in order to obtain the best boundary pos-
sible ."20 
On t.he othr-x hand, in Vergennes' letter to Osaun, dated 
Febru-::try 14, 1775, there is a ccmvincin,g note of" sincerit.y. ~:!()re .. 
over, it is Ver::;ennes t first reference to the c~,:'!lin~ revolution ill 
the Tl.irteen Colonies. Because of their diffic'..uties \'lith the 
colonies, the British, in Vergennes' opinion. would hardly urge 
the ;Portuguesc to cause trouble for Spain in the Rio de 1a Platte 
region. Then he concludes: 
But the more their embarrassment increases and compels them 
to undertake seri OtiS 'YleaSU.l"'0S, +;he L!OrE.: it is necessary for 
us and tor Spain to take precautions so that tihe counterblow 
~l~o~o!,. ~~~~t U:~r~1 (~~ ~e t;~~s\~;~~ ~~~~~j~i1:jrJ,c~t o;~1e!s 
~~~U~iri~:u.;h~d In!~~l t~~r~~!:~th. scndin;; to A::leric;" such 
The expression, fiI am not wi tbout worry, tt seems to be 
the best statement of the attitu.de ot both Vergennes and DtEnnery 
during the next twenty-two months. On June 23, 1775, Vergennes 
wrote to the FrE"-Och ambassador in London that the British might 
be tempted by the French possessi ,n in the Caribbean and that the 
French might have to reenforce her colonial garrisons if the 
British increased their £leet to America. However, only three 
battalions were sent to Saint Domin[;Ue and three to f4artin1que in 
20 Ibig., 12. 
21 ~. 
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september of that year. DtEunery, in replying to a missing; dis-
pa.tch of September 22, further expressed this anx.iety when he 
described the sad state of tr..c colony's defenses t'litll ~l)ccial 
refCl"enee to tho lack of ammunition, powdor, and ril'les. However 
011 October 27. J.715, Vergellnes \.irote a long dispatch to DfEnnery 
in which no reference was made to the sit.uation in the Thirteen 
Colonies.. A letter from the 17rench charge d t atfai;res ill Londou 
writ ten in October at&ting that the French. l.'est Indieu need not 
tear a British attack may have prompted this silence. According 
to a lettor Wl"'i tten on NL~ch 28. 1776, DtEnn~ry stutes that only 
an enormous sum of f:lOney \,lould make Saint Domillgue secure against 
a.ttack. 22 
An analysis of t\IO treaties signed by D t Ennery and 
Count de Solano, the governor of Santo Domingo, on February 29, 
, 
1776, supports this attitude of i:m:xiety rather than panic. Arti-
cle X of the bOWldary treaty provided tor the passage of French 
and Spanish troops through each other's colony. Article II uf' th~ 
treaty for policing the frontier provided I 
In case of war or unexpected attack on one of' the two parts 
of '.:.ne (;olony 7t.l~{,~ aGtion chat, is :-;,,::>t at;,,:3,;:;ke,i '~lill f'UJ:>:ulsh 
to the othtn~ all the help possi~e in men, money. arms, 
arr11'JUllition, tknd 3t~pplifJ$. • • • 
22 ~la~~., 1). 
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the coP-
Df Jtate whi eli considered tht:s€ trcut.ies did not hlake any refer-
~nce to:"'b.e value of the pe;;'milSsioll tlo pass thl'Ouch. ~~auto Doraingo. 
one :niGht thinl .. that this sil!;;l1cC 
r.Cl·C \'lUS no roa1 dar4:';c;J,;' of ii. &i tish at.tucl;:. On ~:ay 19, 11'16, 
til thir4~ ,.u.> you do; 
nothin,::' to rJC fe<:l..ccd at. tLis :;lOment on the: part of the 
they .:.u'(; IJ.\lch too occupie:J. ";'itLtbair colonies. "24 How-
goes un: 
It would be necessu1"'¥ to hi.: in sor:te :J(:<:i~J u.re of ~oi'cna€ tCl'€!; 
if they (the British) believe that \\9 C::.ro c,ble to defend cur-
sel ves. c';3rt.ainly thny '\:i'Q\).J.d a1~'tc.::lI)t notL:in;:;; it is only the 
ease with \\~L:t C~1 an e:;.'pedition could be ;;l,adc Hnd the uaSil.rance 
of success that l'.'C'Juld tempt thorn. It would, theref~~e, b& 




nlis same attitude of "watchful waiting" prevailed even 
atter the French decided to aid the colonies secretly. D'Ennery, 
. . 
on June 15. 1776, was instructed by Vergennes not to leave on 
his planned vacation "until calmer circumstances dispel all the 
anxieties against which it is very difficult to defend our-
selves.-26 He believed the British would not cause France any 
trouble in her colonies because or the many difficulties with 
their own colonies. Although the safety or the French. colonle~ 
might be assured by these difficulties: 
It \liIOuld be more prudent, I think, to owe it (the safety) 
only to ourselves. That is the doctrine that I preach here, 
but you can better establish the necessity (~ar ,.tense). 
You are on the ground. We need your advice. ( 
According to the Corwin theory. one wonders 1£ it was really ad-
vice Vergennes wanted or additional arguments with which he could 
convince Spain and his ministers of the danger ot a British at-
tack. In either case, D'Ennery reluctantly agreed to stay at his 
post. 28 
At the end of AUGUst Vergennes received word ot the 
American declaration of independence through the British news-
papers. This news seemed to strengthen h:ts opinion that there 
26 ~. 
Z7 ~. 
28 IRi~., 15. 
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.as little danger of a British attack. For example, on August ag 
1716, he wrote to D'Ennery that an administrator gifted with his 
foresight was reqtdred by the critical situation in America. 
1ereennes expressed.the fear that British "despair" mieht "bring 
about a catastrophe against which it is wise to be prepared. "29 
He felt that the establishment of a number ot posts, held by sma! 
detachments, would be enough to hold off a large invading torce 
until the deadly weather forced them to withdraw. Because there 
was little danger of a reconciliation oetlfleen the United States 
and Great Britain such an invasion was not to be feared immediate 
1y. He also believed that the struggle would be lone and bloody. 
Since tear is as powerful an argument as 1s love in politics, 0.8 
well as in other matters, Vergennes ha.d f::lore faith in strong 
demonstrat1ons. 30 
Not even the American deteat on Long Island in the 
sumner ot 1776 changed the attitude ot D'Ennery or Vergennes. 
Vergennes informed D'Ennery toward the end or September that he 
could count upon the aid of Solano 1n case of attack and instruct 
ed him to ascertain the strength 0, the Spanieh forces on the is-
\ 
land. There were no detailed orders tor planned action. D'Enna 
29 ~. 
30 lRid • 
,",ook the arune attitude as Vergennes, that ls, that the British 
~ere too busy elsewhere to attempt an attack on Saint Domingue, 
~ut that "it would be more prudent to owe our safety only to our .... 
elves." On November 15, 1176, the King's CounCil drew up some 
~structions for Admiral du Clmffault de Besn', the commander of 
he fleet about to sail for the Caribbean, which coincide perfect-
y with this attitude. I.e the British were to attack Saint Domin-
c~e. he was to rush to its assistance with all his forces. 
1 ovever. he was not to leave the eastern Caribbean if he did not 
eeeive word of an attack on Saint Domingu~. These instructions 
leveal merely the desire to take elementary precautions against 
J~ssible attack rather than any serious alarm.31 
Logan evaluates these documents in this way: 
Unfortunately, the failure ot these colonial documents to re-
veal anything ot value during 1777 prevents us from seeing 
more clearly the French policy on the eve of the American 
alliance. But the documents already printed by Doniol and 
Yela Utrilla show rather convincingly that during most of 
that year Vergem18s was trying to prove to the Spanish chiei 
secretaries, Grimaldi and Florida Blanca that neither wisdom 
nor necessity required the sending of twelve thousand troops 
to the Caribbean in order to prevent a British.attack. In-
deed. when Vereennes began. atter he had received news of the 
American Victory at Saratoga, to drive tor an alliance of the 
two countries with the United States, the astute Florida Bl~ 
ca harped upon France's refusal to accede to his"request as 
a pretext tor obstructing the proposed alllance • .,,2 
31 ~., 15-16. 
32 ~ •• 16. 
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In the light of this old and new testimony and these 
connlcting interpretations Logan drm'Ts these conclusions: 
First, the tradition of a British att:lck upon the French 
West Indies at the £1rst favorable moment was so strong in 
the FI'ench foreign office that Vergennes and most of the 
Council of State expected an-attack in the early days of the 
American Revolution. Second. as the struggle revealed each 
of the contestants increasingly determined to achieve his 
objectives, Vergennes and his advisers aeqaired the convic-
tion that the danger of attack was not imminent. They. 
nevertheless. remained. alert~ Third, atter the American 
victory at Saratoga, Vergennes either sincerely or cleverly 
feal"ed reconciliation and j()int attack. The n6W :llB.tet'!a.ls 
do not help us definitely to solve the ridCle. It is evi-
dent. however t from the docu.rnents alreaJy p",bl:tsh~d that if he has deceived posterity he also deceived contemporary Fr~neh statesmen t for Louts XVI. Haurepas. and other melllhers 
ot the Council 01- State f and Ossun all agreed with him early 
i:1 1778, that there vIas a real da.nger of reconciliation and joint attack. Fourth, tear ot an attack was not the primary 
reason for either French aid or the French alliance bcca~~e 
a possibility 1s bound to be secondary to a certainty. Ther4 
could be no doubt that the loss of the l'hirteen Colonies 
would greatly weaken Great Britain. There was, on tbe other 
hand, only the possibility that Great Britain wou.ld attack 
the French West Indies. Even that contingency had to be 
guarded aBainst because France would gain little, if while 
the n11rteen Colonies were being subtracted fro~the British 
scale, France at the cane time lost her remainin[! possessionf 
in the Western world. J ) 
\1hatever influence the French "est Indies had in deter-
mining l"rench policy from 1775 to 17'lg, probably the most entan-
gling permanent comilitment in the history of the United States 
"forever from the present time and against all other powers. 1f 
According to Article Xl of the Treaty ot Alliance signed an 
-
33 ~., 16-17. 
60 
,ebruary 6, 1778, the United States promised to support France by 
military meaaures in detendine the French 1:'est Indies from at-
tae}c.34 Some one might think that this guarantee reveals a real 
tear on the part ot France of a British attack on her Caribbean 
colonies. 
'!'he desire to promote commerce between the United 
States and France, including the French West Indies, was another 
possible reason tor French aid and the alliance. Logan states 
that one writer is ot the opinion that the main reason for French 
policy was the desire to increase Franoets commerce lath the 
United States. This interpretation seems a little far-fetched. 
As early as September of 1776 Vergennes obscured the importance 
or commerce between the United States and Saint Domingue. In a 
letter to D'Ennery he mentions that France had obtained permissior: 
trom Spain to obtain supplies far her west Indian colonies from 
certain Spanish colonies, including Louisiana. However, since 
this would not be enough, American help "would be more abundant 
and tIore diI'ect. tf He would recommend.· thoref'oI'c, that tormer 
restr"ict1ve measures be relaxed. He concludes, "our best .fr'iend 
18 the one who helps Us to live. tt35 Late in December ot 1776 he 
• 
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expressed the hope to DtEnnery that many American ships would 
enrry supplies, timber t and tobacco to Saint Domingue during the 
tlinter. Be5..ng; very optir:dstic, he thought that DtEruwry tJight 
obt3.in a surplus from the Americans thr'1t he could send to 
Frnnce.36 It is difficult to deterrnine just LO\I Lluch comr~erce 
\'lent to Saint Doningue during the l'f.::lr. "The first pI'i vats bankel~ 
in th e Unitod States," Stephen Girru."d started his enOI'I;)'OUS for-
tune by tt'ading 'ttith Saint Domin&'Uc during the American H.evolutio 
and in the }rears i"lhich followed. The dependence of these porte 
upon foreign tra.de when France was at uar is shown by the opening 
of colonial pori~s to foreign vessels in 1778. A competent French 
. 
d1plo.'1lat, Louis Guillaume Otto. at one tine charge d'u.ffaires in 
the United Stntes t c.eclnred in 1197: 
In sacrificing so many mE"..n and millions (of francs) to BUS-
tain the Unit.ed States, the Royal Government had in view 
l"k"llting the Un.ited States the comple'.lent to our western 
colonies by finding 1n the United States at all times pro-
vi.s1ona fl'lr our '.'{est Indies or for our "tax·ships.)? 
In other wordttJ, in war as w~11 as in peace, an lndependent Uni.ted 
States eould supply Saint Domineue, as well. as other French pos-
sessions, with necessnry provisions that British colonies t;ould 
be prevented froM do ing. This aI'r;ument was promoted at a time 
36 !P.1..4.. t lee 
37 Lb.1.1.. 19. 
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~hen some French statesmen were recommendine a friendly policy 
toward the United States in the face of considerable opposition.38 
The terms of the Treaty of Amity and Oommerce, signed 
on February 6, 1778, show that the desire for comnlerce between 
the United States and the Frmch West Indies was only a secondary 
consideration. It granted to Americans the most-favored nation 
treatment but confined it to the French ports in Europe. Althougt 
she did not open any new ports, France promised to keep open the 
existine free ports in the Caribbean. The treaty so~~ht to pro-
mote trade between the United States and the ~est Indies in only 
one way. By the terms of the original treaty molasses taken by 
the Americans from those islands was exempted from the payment ot 
duty in the United States. In return, the Americans promised not 
to impose an export tax on goods taken by Frenchmen to those 
possessions from the United States. France did not insist upon 
these provisions being retained when southern interests and tem-
perance advocates prevented the adoption of these clauses by the 
Continental Congress beoause it meant an increase in trade for 
the northern states. Although it does not seem to be the main 
reason tor the French desire to help in the founding of an 
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independent United States, co~aerce between the United States and 
saint Domingue did assume a role of major importance.J9 
The opportunity for profits seen by some French friends 
of the United States must also be considered as one of the mo-
tives behind French policy. At the same time the importance of 
Saint Domingue in the plan ot secret aid may be examined. The 
personal interest of some American officials in transactions con-
ducted through the colony is also indicated. 
It was reported by D'Ennery that Americans bought a 
lot of powder in Saint Domingue as early as September, 1775. He 
wrote to Vergennes, perhaps facetiously, "You understand how very 
difficult it is, even with the best intentions in the world, to 
prevent a merchant here from selling his powder to one who is 
obscurely the secret agent of some merchant from llew Eneland. ,,40 
He also reported that the Dutch purchased powder at Saint Domin-
eue, carried it to the island ot St. Eustatius, and then would 
resell it to the American agents bhere. The part that island 
played in providin~ powder that helped the Americans to keep 
fightine has already been told. However, one can not entirely 
discount the powder which came to the United States from Saint 
40 Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," 
American li.i:stQrt;iJ, Rftvtmt, 1925, XXX, 271-282. 
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Domingue either directly or by way of St. Euatatius. 41 The Con-
tinental Coneress took full advantage of the opportunities offeree 
by the Caribbean islands tor buyine the supplies so ~~dly needed 
by the Americans. On October 13, 1775. the Committee ot the 
t1hole passed a resolution wh:.ch recommended that the various 
revolutionary assemblies export certain products at their own 
risk to the West Indies 1n return tor sal petre, sulphur, ammuni-
tion, and arms. The governor of Saint Domingue was sending muni-
tions to the Americans, Lord Stormont complained. At the end ot 
1775, a French agent in the United States, Bonvouloir, reported 
that the Americans wanted to buy supplies in Saint Domingue and 
to receive two military engineers by way of that island.42 
The plan by which France sent aid to the Americans 
through Saint Domingue developed in the brilliant mind ot Caron 
de Beaumarchais. His love affair with the beautiful Pauline de 
Breton gave Beaumarchais a romantic interest in Saint DominGUe. 
As u result of investments he had made there. he also had a finan-
cial interest. \vhen he wrote his trunous memoir, "Peace or War," 
41 Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the American Revo1ution,fi 
·42 Logan, D1plomat1~ RelatioQ! ~ ~ UD6ted StQt2§ 
.and HAiti, 20. 
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'Which helped to form the ideas already in tho mind of Vergennes, 
he mig,ht have had Saint Domingue in mind. At about the same 
time a confidential memorandum which Baaumarchais submitted to 
the king proposed the torllk'ltion of a comrlH:)rciul house. Roderique 
Hortalez and Company, to handle the secret French aid. They 
could be absolutely sure of the transportation of munitions to 
Cap FranCOis, which had been chosen as the first port ot deposit 
in America, it they used French vessels. 4J Using 1ntonnation 
given him by Beaumarchais, Arthur Lee, in the sprin~ of 1776, 
wrote from London to the Secret Commit tee ot Congress that France 
was ready to send five millions of livres worth of an~unition and 
arms to Cap 1"roocoi8 from where it would be sent to the colonies. 
In his RetJ.ets;~onl or April, 1776, Vergennes suggested: 
The colonists would send to our ports their ships lade.n with 
goods and take in return arms and ammunitions, paying the 
difference not in currency t but in goods delivered to either 
Saint Domineue or to one or our European ports.44 
It became evident that the Americans would be expected to aid 
the French colony in return tor aid sent to them through. Saint 
Domingue. 
43· l'Ja Deille PHem• Col,lectiw,! 2l ~ .us IQ!:k H1;to£i<;€\l: Soctetv, New York, 1 7, XIX, 106-113. 
44 Logan. Diplgmattc fStlition§ sL A.!li Un!teg §~atgl 1m!! 
Haiti, 21. 
-66 
Briefly summarized, the following are the propositions 







The aspect of a speculation of an individual to which 
the French government were strangers, was to be main-
tained throughout. 
To aRRest 80, it must be la, up to a certain point. 
The French government would eive one million francs. 
It would influence Spain to give an equal sum. 
Beaumarchais would ask other parties to subscribe to 
his enterprise. 
Beaumarchais would establish a large cODmlercial house, 
and, at hls own risk and peril, he could supply America 
with arms, ammunition, etc. 
The French arsenals would deliver to this company arms 
and ammunition to be replaced or paid for. 
Beaumarchais and h.i..8 company were not to demand money 
of the Americana, but produce of their soil; such pay 
was to be distributed throughout the kingdom and the 
enterprise would become self-supporting. 
The French government was to reserve the right to favor 
or oppose the company. accordine to political contin-
gencies. 
Beaumarchais was to render to the French government an 
account of the proi1ts and losses of the enterprise. 
The French government was to decide whether to [~ant new 
contributions or discharge tl~ company from all obliga-
tions previously sanctioned.4; 
Thie plan will be discussed more fully later in this 
Only exhaustive research could establish just how much 
aid went to the Americans by way of Saint Domingue. Two British 
• 
45 Blnnche !:vans Hazard, 'Beawnarcl\.a.is .iW1 the Americ911 
Revolutiqn. Boston, 1910, 19-20. 
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t.rigates stationed orf Mole St, Nicolas early on 1776 hindered 
trade relations. The British protested against the sale of 
powde:c 7_\1 Saint DOmingue to the Americans in June. Four months 
later Vereennss wrote D'Ennery that the contraband trade between 
the cr:: '1'.S and the United States was probably not as great as 
Stormont thought it to be. Nevertheless. he recammended that the 
contraband trade be completely stopped in order to convince Great 
Britain of the French desire to stay on friendly terms with her~6 
Vergennes and Beaumarcha1s were perfecting their plan 
of secret aid beneath this cloak ot friendship. The first ship 
of Hortales and Company did not set sail tor the United States 
by way of Saint Domingue Wltil the end of the year. In Deceaber 
Beaumarchais informed Vergennes that the AmRh1tr'~i was ready to 
carry a regiment of Irish soldiers and supplies to the United 
States. Since }t"'rance had the right to send reenforcements and 
supplies to her own colony, the ship's papers were to show that 
the entire consignment was for D'Ennery. Beaumarchais kept 
Carabas. one ot his at~ents, in Saint Domingue in order to super-
vise the operations there. Vergennes was notified by Beaumarchais 
on July 1, 1777, that the cargo of the Amllie, having reached 
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saint Domingue, was already on the wa.y to the United States in 
several American sh ips. Beaumarchais wrote to France, his agent 
in the United States. on December 20, 1777, that a vessel con-
taining more than one hundred cannon and uniforms for the Ameri-
can soldiers was beinG sent to Saint Domingue. The American ship. 
"ere to lie off Cap Francais. They were to hoist the Dutch flag 
to the main mast and fire five shots after gi vine the preliminary 
signal. Then the French ship was to go out and allow itself to 
be captured and taken into an American port where, after a trial, 
it was to be released. In the meantime the Americans would have 
had the cargo turned over to then. 47 
The Americans were acti ve in the meanwhile. \l/illiam 
Binr,ham, the first purchasine aeent in the Caribbean, went out 
to I.1artinique where he played an important part in sending sup-
plies to the United States. Kichnrd Harrison was sent in a simi-
lar capacity to Cap Francais, Silas Deane was informed by Richard 
~orris on Aur,ust 11, 1775. However, there is no evidence that he 
~ul.filled his mission. Norris sug,gested to Deane that they en-
gage in a little private business for themselves through Saint 
Domineue at the same time. In another letter written a month 
later lJiorris states that the American purchasing agents were 
~tephen Ceronio and Jolm Dupuy_ Deane was instructed that, since 
47 loW., 22. 
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they 'tlare the safest routes, he 'Was to continue sf'.nding supplies 
by way of ?lIartinique and Saint Doming;ue. The French were ureed 
by Deane in January, 1777, to speed up shipments by way of Saint 
Domingue. Nicholas Rogers, an American agent at Port-au-Prince, 
three months later informed Deane that eleven American ships were 
at the Cap and that five or six had just left tor the United 
states. At the end ot June, 1777, the shiP. k§ #2cOO. in which 
orris and Deane had an interest ot one hundred thousand livres, 
rived safely at Charleston, South Carolina, by way of Saint 
A Captain Lundaie was advised by Deane to go to the 
nited States by way of the colony in September. Any artillery 
fficers which mi~pt be with h1m were to be disguised as sailors 
r passengers for Saint Domingue. A few days later, Deane, wr1t-
nr; to the Committee on Forei~ Affairs, expressed the hope that 
. 8 
There§e, a ship he had sent by that route, had arrived. 4 
One must be very cautius in any statement as to the 
of the aid that the United States received through Saint 
mingue. Ships did not always reach their ultimate destination 
they landed in the island. For instance, in 1779 
anklin informed the Continental Congress that the supplies trom 
wo large ships were still in Saint Dominr;ue although they had 
rived there many months before. fievertheless, it is certain 
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that the aid sent before and after the alliance was considerabl~49 
Some of the foreign volunteers used Saint Domingue as a 
means of assuring sate passage to the United States. Among the 
first was Voidke, a Prussian. who later attained the rank ot 
brigadier general, and participated in ~le siege of Quebec, who 
passed through the colony in the fall of 1775 with a passport 
from Vergennes authorizing him to join the Americans. General du 
portall, who served as chief ot engineers at Valley Farge during 
that fateful winter and \\ho built the delenses that saved \,iashing ... 
ton's army, came to Philadelphia by way of Saint Domingue. De 
Kalb, Lafayette, and their comrades an the ~ V'SM21£! falsely 
swore to port authorities at Bordeaux in Mru:'ch, 1777, that they 
~ere going to Saint Domingue • .50 
SaiD. t Domingue was not the scene of any important 
military or naval operations before the French alliance. The 
Continental Congress appointed a committee to arrange with Bajeu 
Laporte, a Frenchman, the terms ot EX Cal tract far raising a regi-
ment of French soldiers in Saint Domineue and Martinique on 
~~ay 9, 1777. The records tail to show whether the contract was 
49 ~., 23-24. 




51 e~acutod. 'l'he Gontinon:tn.l brig, "ctQUgtQll. !;1Uc1e n cruise to 
tho Caribbean, but l'laG capturer! on ita return from Cap Francais.52 
nost of the 1:»:~1V'ateel"s eOfI1I1isaioned by the lU:lEll·ict:ms confined 
th~31r activ1t:tes to the eaat;Cl'n end of' thE' COl"1bboan • .53 
r'toat of tho navnl enr;aceoents. aVel} atter t.he i11'"ench 
ent(JrtHl the wax', took k-"llacc i., t..l-to aastf::rn oM ot tho Caribuc£u1.5 
Saint Dooingue became the ht,UJO or operations when tho L?l"'onoh 
anted to join the Amtu."1cl.UlS in nav£u Ol·f:lilitr:u. ... Y operations. In 
17"l? i\drniral D'7.staint1 salled f"ot} th~u"(;} for tLc ntt.ack on 
S:.rV'annah. About 91.",< hUlldl~e\l coloro(l Bud iJer;l"O tz'oops trom L)aint 
Do!;i.1.ngue p;:.1rticlpot,ed in this attuck. '.11eY ti1splaytnl conap.iouous 
in coverinj1 too retl'"eat of the !I~roneh nnd. Araeric..:Ul forcGS 
bruve, but c'u'sorganiaod attaok that had. all'>ondy been 
cvoalod in ndvnnco to tbo Bl""i tisb. l~ven thou!;} tho attack tailed 
ld the }>):oooo11 fleet had toretut"'n tn the Koat Indies, news of 
oxpedition forced the British t-o ahandon Haraca.nsett Buy, in 
51 '~jorthington Chauncey FOl"'d. e,.11tor, altlWJliM Jat .1£la 
p.:o::I~w.Ii_~ ~ili. ~JQ8hinf;tonf ;). C. ,1907. VII, 342. 
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l\odneyfs opinion, "the best and noblest harbor in America.,,55 
It may be that the yearnine for their own liberty in the minds ot 
the more intelligent Negroes and mulattoes like Christophe and 
f,jartial Besse was aroused by the experience ot fighting for the 
independence ot others. 
On August 5, 1781, the French neet sailed from Cap 
Francais under Admiral de Grasse. Through its viotory in Lynn-
haven Bay, the actual fighting, as tar as the Americans were 
concerned, was brought to a close with the surrender of Cornwalli 
at Yorktown. A large part ot the French neat deteated by Rodney 
in the Battle ot the Saints on April 9, 1782, was assembled at 
Cap Francais. The Windward Passage was closely watched by Rodney 
to the end of the war. The necessity of guarding the merchant 
fleet from Saint Domingue from the danger of a British attack 
lUlited the French naval assistance to the United States. This 
possible British attack caused great tear among French merchants. 
Logan has this to say of the part played by Saint 
Domingue in the peace negotiations: 
AlthouP~ Saint Domingue was not mentioned i~ the treaty ot 
peace 5etwecn France and Great Britain, it had been 
55 ,bid ... U5. 
56 Logan, DiRlomat~c llelgtio!}§ .9! the Up1ted Stat!; 
d HA:L~i;. 26. 
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frequently discussed in the negotiations. One of the 
proposals looked to the exchange of Gibraltar by the British 
for certain French and Spanish possessions. Some British 
planters feared that France, in return for helping Spain 
in her efforts to recover Gibraltar, might be given Santo 
Domingo. In that event, they contended France with her 
alrea.dy vast sugar estates in Saint Domingue would be able 
to control the world sugar market. t:hile this fear was not 
the only reason for 8ri tain' $ reiusal to relinquish Gibral-
tar, it indicates a vital interest in Saint Domingue that 
will help to clarity British policy dUring the quarter of a 
century in which the diplomatic history of the United States 
was mo~; closely connected with events in Saint Domin[jUe and Haiti. 
51 ~. 
CHAPTEh IV 
FRENCH AID TO Tue COLONIES 
The aid which France sent to the colonies played a 
ajor part in the success of the revolution. Betore the Treaty 
f Alliance was signed in 1778, France sent secret help to the 
evolting colonies. This aid, both secret and official, was sent 
o America via the French West Indies. 
Confining our attention from the beginning to the ques-
ion of what were the gfficial motives of French intervention, we 
ave to consider, in the first place, the Count de Vergennes's 
ttempt to represent his program, which eventually became that ot 
is government, as essentially defensive. In his "Considerations" 
r 1;!arch, 1776, which led directly to the policy of secret aid to 
e Americans, Vergennes urged upon the kine and his associates 
e argument that, whether England subdued her rebellious colonies 
< 
lost them, she would probably attack the French West Indies 
o~de{ to use the large forces she would have assembled, and 
in order to indermify herself. In his "Memoire" of July 2.3, 
urging an early alliance with the Americans, he took much 
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the same line. ~1e policy of secret aid had been well enough in 
its day, but it had not secured the Americas for France and Spain. 
1£ England could not speedily erush the American revolt, she must 
take terms with the colonies. Those whom she had failed to retain 
as subjects she would make allies, in a joint assault upon the 
riches of Peru and Mexico and the French Sugar Islands. 
There is, to say the least, something of an inconsist-
ency in Vergennes's building an argument for an alliance with the 
Americans to protect French interests in the Caribbean upon the 
increase of danger resulting to those interests from his own 
policy of secret aid. This inconsistency affords a clue to a yet 
~ore striking one. In the summer of 1776, when he thought that 
,rance could count on the active assistance of Spain, Vergennes 
definitely proposed war with England and the proposition was ten-
~atively ratified by the King and caUDell. A little later, how-
ever. came the news of the defeat on Long Island and Vergennes 
ibeat a retreat from his own program. In other words J it would 
seem that the danger which, by the argument in "Considerations,ft 
would menace France if England should subjugate her rebellious 
colonies 'Was one that could be safely awaited in quiet, but toot 
"he one threatening from the contrary contingency was one that 
tIlUst be met half-way. Yet it was the latter contingency p,recisely 
which the policy of secret aid was designed to make sure. 
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Again, a British attack upon the Caribbean possessions 
~ould, of course, have forced France to come to their defense. 
It may be gravely doubted whether It"'rench official opinion held 
these possessions, after 1763, in suffiCient esteem to have war-
ranted a policy that materially increased the likelihood of a 
serious war endangering their own security. Indeed, Vergennes 
himself declared on one occasion that the French West Indies 
could offer but slight temptation to English cupidity, that 
England already had enough such possessions. Finally, there is 
every reason to believe that both France and Spain could, at any 
time betore 177g, have obtained from England, in return for a 
pledge ot neutrality, a specific guaranty so long as peace con-
tinued on the Continent of Europe. Ilone the less, Vergennes trom 
the first consistently repelled all such proposals. l 
Vergennes had been haunted with the bogey from 1776 on, 
that, as a result of America's struggle tor independence, France 
~d Spain would lose their West Indian possessions. It was Beau-
marchais's fine Italian hand that first planted this thorn, which 
pever ceased to worry Vergennes until the war was ended. Thoup)l 
1 Edwa.rd S. COrwin, tfThe French Objective in the Ameri-






figaro was only a creature of Beaumarcha.is's fancy, the intriguing 
author was a remarkable embodiment of his own imagina.ry hero. He 
~elt with comfort in the house of diplomacy, which has been 
palled the chosen abode of lies. On his return from England 
~fter his curious adventure with the mysterious Chevalier dtEon, 
~eaumarchais informed the king, by means of a memorial, that he 
pad met an Arthur Lee in London, a representative of the Contin-
~utal Congress, who had, in its name, offered France, for its 
~ecret aid, all the advantages of American commerce. However, 
~ee threatened, if France refused, America would send her first 
prizes into French ports, and force France either to admit or 
"orbid them. Forbid, and America would accept peace and ~ioin with 
~gland ,in an attack on the French \vest Indies Islands; admit them 
md a rupture with En~~and would follow anyway. Whether Lee or 
)eaumarchais invented this striking and terrible dilemma is not 
ertain, but the menace of its horns never ceased to worry Ver-
~ennes. At least he neVer ceased to pretend to be worried by 
hem. 2 
2 Claude Van Tyne, "Influences \'1hich Determined the 
i'rench Government to P,1a.ke the Treaty with America. in 1778, ff 
wer1can H1;atgricM H.lxta, XXI, 534-535. 
-Frederick the Great, secret enemy of England, had even 
~arlier planted at the French court a like insidious idea through 
his minister in Paris. He sug.J;ested that France and Spain "had 
best reintorce themselves, it (Great Britain) will seize the oc-
casion, after subjugating its colonies, to attack the Spanish and 
lFrench po~sessions there.") St. Germain in a'memoir to Vergennes, 
~!arch 1, 1776, declared his belief that when England was through 
~th the American struc;gle, whether she won or lost. she would 
recoup her losses by seizing the French West India Islands. "The 
ease of conquest would sug;~ost the idea and the excuses are easy 
~o find. ,,4 Beauroarchais t s sllt~L';estion had made its instant appeal 
~o Vergennests imagination, and in his next memoir to the cabinet, 
he dwelt upon it at length, and suggested secret aid and at the 
same t 1me preparation for war. Even Turgot, in his re'flections on 
~ergennesfs memoir, thought it likely that it England failed she 
~ould wipe out the shame by an attack on Martinique and Porto Rico 
~et he suggests that England may be too exhausted financially. Fo 
l1ergennes there was no such hope and for the next eighteen months 
his letters are filled with warnin{;;s of thcl.t d.aneer. He was con-
liinually plying Spain with reasons tor being ready for war, and, 
) 1l2!5!., 5) 5. 
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indeed, any time after 1776 he would have plunged France into war 
~th England. if Spain would have joined her. S 
Spain saw in the American Revolution a possible opportu-
nity for safeguarding her American interests, in weakening the 
dominion of the English race through the revolt of the colonies. 
spain gave secretly to France one million of the three million 
francs handed by the French in 1776 to the American Commissioners. 
As the war progressed and the issue was clearly independence, 
spain was no longer inclined to help in a movement ~lich would be 
a dangerous precedent to her own colonies. If successful. it 
would build up on her borders a sovereignity in its political 
principle very hostile to her traditions, and occupied by a people 
whose energy and aggressiveness would be made more formidable by 
a successful war. nlis was the second attitude assumed by Spain 
to our Revolution; an attitude of annoyance. of displeasure, of 
anxiety, causing her to repel any advance made by us with a sullen 
though adroit persistence. 6 
Van Tyne mentions many of the rumors which were wide-
spread. Early in 1775 colonia.l journals spread the tale of forty 
'I' 
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Ships of war building in Sweden for the French government with an 
eye to the quarrel between England and America. In !Itay an imagi-
nary French fleet had put to sea to give aid to American ships. 
By fall the papers carried the rumor that France and Spain had a 
greater sea force than Britain could muster in a year. That 
superior French and Spanish fleets were in the West Indies. That 
Choiseul was again in favor and would lead France and Spain at 
once into war with England. Algiers was attacked, and Gibraltar 
besieged by the Spanish, ran the wild rumors. By midsummer of 
1776 the newspapers deluded Americans with a French general and 
an admiral in the \iest Indies ready to begin hostilities against 
England as soon as Congress decided upon independence.? 
Since French finances seemed to shut out open war, 
secret aid was the one solution indicated. That would brine the 
fruits of a great victory without the danger of combat. Then, to 
clinch all other arguments Beaumarchais, after meeting Arthur Lee 
in London, audaciously wrote the king: "We must aid the Ameri-
cans," to save our own West Indies. Lee had declared that the 
Continental Congress had authorized him to demand a treaty of 
7 Claude H. Van Tyne, "French Aid Before the Alliance 
of 1778, n MarleAU H:i;§tgrical, neviey, XXXI, 34. 
~omrJerce with France in order that America mif:".ht eet from her the 
Inunitions of war without which defeat was certain. Should France 
r-efuse, Lee threatened, America. must yield to Eng].and t and then, 
~hat the two parts of the empire might become reconciled by fight-
~g side by side, they -would unite in an attack on the French and 
~panish West Indies. It is impossible to determine whether Lee 
~r Beaumarcha1s invented this amazinr; threat, but it \'ias just the 
lIlenace to have the f,reatest effect with the French ministry. Over 
and over again that frightful portent had appeared in reports and 
"met:loire" tarllil1ar to every member of the ministry. DeKal b proph .... 
esied it in his report in 176$. St. Germain tl'rice raised the 
spectre in his "memoires" to the king. "The ease ot conquest 
~uld suggest the idea," he wrote, "the exeuses are easy to find." 
Pnly thus could Eneland recoup her losses. Turgot. had the same 
~ision. fearinG most for Martinique and Porto Rico. Only thus 
pould the government hide its shame from the Enr).iah nation. In-
~eed. John Adams had intimated as much in the Continental Congress 
lihough that could not have been known to the French ministry. 8 
A letter without date, published for the first time by 
Peorge Clinton Genet in the I~ligaaiM Slt. Amerisms Hi'xorv, written 
i! 
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by Beaurnnrcha,ls to the King, gives a clear statement of how he 
proposed to proceed in foundinp; this new mercantile house, which 
should hide from all the world. and even from the A."11ericnns thern-
eel ~les the conni Viffice of the Government in the operations: 
To the King alone: 
l<mile stnte reasons engflge you to extend a helpin;.:; hand 
to the Americans, policy requires that your I,liajesty shall 
take abundant precaution to prevent the secret succor sent to 
America from becoming a firebrand between :£I"rance and '8ngland 
in Europe. • • • On the other hand, prudence wills that you 
acquire a certainty that your funds may never fall into other 
hands than those for whom you destined them. Finally, the 
present condition of your finances does not permit you to 
make so great sacrifice at the moment as passing events seem 
to require. 
It becomes my duty, Sire, to present to you, and it is 
for your wisdom to examine the follo-wing plan, the chief ob-
ject of which is to avoid, by a turn, which is absolutely 
commercial, the suspicion that your },lajesty has any h~md in 
the affair. 
The principal merit of this plan is to auement your aid 
so that a single million. • • will produce the same results 
for the Americans as if your Majesty really hud disbursed 
nine millions in their favor • • •• Your Majesty will be-
c:in by placing a million at the disposition of your agent, 
who will be named Roderigue Hortales et Cia: this is their 
comr::1ercial name t1.nd sienature, under which I find it conven-
ient that the t/hole operation s~..a.ll be carried out. • • • 
One half' million exchane;ed into Portugese pieces, the only 
money current in America, will be promptly sent there, for 
there is an imm.odiate necessity for the Americans to have a 
little gold at once to give life to their paper money, which 
without means of making it circulate already has become use-
less and 8tar~ant in their hcmds. It is the little leaven 
tha.t 1s necessary to put into the paste to raise it and make 
it ferment usefully. 
Upon that half million no benefit can be obtained except 
the return of it in Virginian tobacco, which Congress must 
-furnish to the house of Hortales, \-mo will have made a sale 
in advJ:1I1ce to the Farmers-General of Fr~mce, by which they 
will take the tobacco from them at a good price; but that 
is of no ~eat consequence • 
.Roderir;ue Hortales counts on employing the second half 
million in the purchaso of cannon9and powder, which he \.'111 forward at once to the Americans. 
Here follows an exposition ot the proceedings, with an 
explanation of how, supposing the king permits him to buy powder 
at the actual cost price from the magazines. instead of buying it 
in the market of France, Holland, or elsewhere. the money invested 
by the kinF~ will increase not in double pror,ression, 1, 2, 4, e. 
etc., but in triple progression 1, 3, 9, 27. etc. 
-
Your Majesty will not be frii~htened at the complicated 
air that this operation assum<.~s under my pen, when you re-
member that no commercial speculation is carried on or suc-
ceeds by any more simple or natural means than this. 
I have treated this ariair in so tar, Sire, in the 
spirit of a. great trader. who wishes to make a successful 
speculation and I have developed to you the unique secret 
by Which commerce in bulk augments the prosperity of all 
states that ha'Ve the good sense to protect it. • • • 
It the return in tobacco and the sale of the product 
take place a.s I ha"'le pointed out, Your Majesty, soon will 
.find yourself in a position to send buck by the hands ot 
Hortales et Cie, the three million provided for troe the 
price and profits ~£ these returns, to recommence operations 
on a larger scale. 
9 Elizabeth s. Kite, ,eiUfll3rchai§ .i!!S the l'Jm: .2l Ameri-~ XndependeQc" Boston. 1918, I, 7-79. 
10 !h!a., lIt 79-80. 
-Then follow considerations upon the auvisability of ertl-
playing Dutch or Fl·ench vessels for the transport of the munitione 
to Cape Francais. chosen by Hartales at Cie, as the first depot 
of commerce. 
Holding to the choice ot Irench vessel charged to the 
account ot Roderigue Hortales et Cie, Congress, or rather 
l'lr. Adams, Secretary of Congress, will be alone forewarned 
by the agent in England that a. vessel is carrying to him at 
Cape Francais both goods and munitions, which are to be re-
turned in Virginian tobacco, so that he may send to the Cape 
upon a vessel landed with tobacco an agent who will bear his 
power to receive both and to send back by the captain of 
Hortales et C1e •• the entire return in tobacco or at all 
events a recognition that he owes Uortales at Cie. the 
ba.lance of the a,q1ount tor which he may not have been able to 
furnish return.J.J. 
So tar, in Beaumurchais's mind, the mercantile undertak-
ing 'WaS to be tor the king, only cloaked by the appearance of a. 
Imercantile house. It seems, however, that the French government, 
anxious to evade all possibl(~ risk and wishing to deny all conni-
vance in the transactions J decided to rernain entirely foreien to 
Ithe operation. 
The government said: 
lie will give you secretly a million. i'1e will try to ob-
tain the same amount from the court of Spain ••• with 
these ttlO million and the co-operation of private individualSj 
whom you will associate in your enterprise, you will found 
your house and at your own risk and perils you \dll 
11 Ibid., II, gO. 
provision the Americans with ar~~ and munitions, and objects 
of equipment and whatever is necessary to support the war. 
Our arsenals will deliver to you these things, but you will 
replace them or pay tor them. You shall not demand money 
or the Americans because they have none, but you shall ask 
returns in commodities of their soil, the sale or which we 
will facilitate in our country. • •• In a word, the opera-
tion secretly sanctioned by us at the outset must erow and 
develop through its own support. But on the other hand, we 
reserve the right of favoring or opposing it according to 
political contingencies. You will rendel' us an account or 
your profits and losses, while we will decide whether we 
should grant you new SUb!~dies or discharge you or all obli-
gations previously made. 
In this transaction, the responsibility of the agent to 
~he United States had no consideration. The advances of the gov-
~ment were siP.lply a guarantee to Beaumarchais against loss. 
The difficulties and dangers of this undertaking, ac-
~ording to I;!. de Lomenie, were of a nature to cause any man other 
han Beaurnarchais to hesitate. He, however, threw himself into 
his with all his usual coura~e. On the tenth of June, 1776, a 
onth before the United States had published their Declaration ot 
ndependence, he signed the tamoua receipt which occasioned a suit 
astin~ fifty years. The receipt read thus: 
I have received of IiI. Duvergier, conformably to the 
orders ot 1/;. de Vergennes, on the date of the 5th of this 
month the sum of one million, for which I shall render count 
12 Ibid., II, 81. 
-to my said Sieur Comte de Vergennes. 
Caron de Beaumarchais. 
Good for a million of livres tournois. 
At Paris, this 10th of June, 1776.J.J 
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Two months In tel", Spain advanced a like sum. In addi-
~ion to this Beaumarchais associated himself' with numerous private 
~ndiv1duals in France and elsewhere, so that his first sendine to 
~he runericans surpassed three millions. 
Early in June the vast roorcantile house of H.oderigue 
~ortales et Cie was established at Paris, while agents, clerks, 
~d employees of' every sort were installed at the center of opera-
~ions, as well as at the various sources of supplies and in the 
~eaports. Beaumnrchais remained the head and center of action in 
~very place. 
It so happened, that a complete change was beinl~ r:1ade 
n the equipment ot the French army, so that the arsenals and 
~orts were charged with munitions of war, which the governr:1ent was 
~illing to dispose of at a nominal price. l4 
Before the arrival of Beaumarchais on the scene ot ac-
~ion the Comte de Vergennes had countenanced and furthered the 
~perations be£l,'Un by Franklin before he lett London. Among the 
gents employed by the latter were the Brothers Mantaudoin of 
13 Ibtd.t II, $1-82. 
11.. Ib:i,d., II, 82. 
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Ne.utes. \-/ho had undertaken the transportati on of munitions of war 
to the Americans. 
Another abent and intimate friend of Franklin was a 
certain Doctor Dubourg, a man mor e or 1e as widely known as a 
scientist, but possessinG as well, a decided ta.ste for mercantile 
operations. He had entered heartily into the cause of the k.reri-
cans, and was very zealous in forwarding munitions of war to the 
insurgents. He seems at the beginninG to have possessed to a 
considerable degree the confidence of the French minister. who 
deigned to correspond with hun in person, and to consult him on 
several occasions. As it bect::L.'!le necessary "to act on a grander 
scale t the interverltion of the friend of Franklin was no longer 
sufficient." The "faithful and discreet agent" spoken of in the 
a§fl;e~'oDI had long been fixed in the mind of the Hinister of War. 
The good doctor, who knew nothing ot the relationship between the 
faraGus author of the BarRiel" 5l! §evhJrl, and the French government 
or of his interest and services in the cause of American Independ-
ence J all along had been secretly aspiring to a complete control 
of the transactions. \'nult succeeded in convincing him that he was 
destined tor the place was that early in June, 1776, Silas Deane, 
the 2l{;ent of the Secret Committee ot Congress, arrived in Paris 
charged with a letter .from Franklin to his ttdear f~ood friend, 
Barbeu Dubourg, tf with express instructions to regard this latter 
S8 
as "the best ,~:lde to seek after and to to 1 low • ,,15 
Elated at this mark of esteem shown hinl by the colonies ~ 
Dubourg undertook to fulfill then to the letter the instructions 
of Congress and to prevent Silas Deane tram coming in contact 
with anyone, but himself. Deane soon realized that though "in-
spired with the best intentions in the world, ft the doctor would 
be Us hindrance rather than the essential personage pointed out 
by Franklin.,,16 He, therefore, insisted so strongly upon meeting 
the French minister tha.t Dubaurg was forced to yield. The meetin 
took place the 17th day at July, 1776. 
Silas Deane at this important meeting fulfilled the in. 
tention of his mandate with intelligence, and with a reasoning, 
which could only come from a vir;ilant patriotism. All the impres-
sian, which he could desire to produce and which W;lS hoped from 
his miSSion, flowed from his replies. l ? 
The Count de Vergennes appeared to refuse to give the 
aid asked. but he led Silas Deane to understand that a confiden-
tial agent 'Would take the matter in charge. This confidential 
agent was no other than Beaumarchais. 
15 ~ •• II, 82-83. 
16 ~.f II, 83. 
17 ~., II, 84. 
-Four days before this interview, Doctor Dubourg had 
learned to his ,great disappointment where the confidence of the 
minister had been placed. Knowing nothing of the real situation, 
he thought to disuade Deane from his choice by attacking the 
private character of the man who had usurped his place. The 
effect of his letter upon the Coote de Vergennes can be judged 
from the fact thnt the latter immediately communicated it to 
18 Beaumarcha1s himself, who was charged with the reply. 
On the 11th of July, Silas Deane and Beaumarchais met 
for the first time. Both men recoenized at once in the other, thE 
mlln for whom each was looking. Both had warm, generous, and un-
selfish natures. Both had their minds fixed upon ane object 
alone, the procuring and sending; of aid as quickly as possible to 
the insurged colonies. In excusinr.; himself to Congress tor dis-
carding the services of the ffdear, good friend" of Franklin, 
l,ir. Deane wrote: "I have been forced to discourage my .friend on 
seaing where tho confidence ot M. de Vergennes was placed." At 
the same t1rne he does al!l.ple justice to the kindness and interest 
19 
manifested by Dubourg. 
Beaumarchais, finding Silas Deane empowered by Con["):,,ess 
to act directly, ceased to communicate with Arthur Lee. 
16 ~. 
19 ,b!d., II, 81. 
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Already a change had come in their relationship. \lhen 
be returned to France he found the government bent upon another 
form of offering aid to the Americans. It became necessary to 
break his connections with Lee. Unable to explain the true 
na.ture of the enterprise, because he was bound to absolute secre-
cy, Beaumarchais wrote on the 12th of June, 1776: ttThe difficul-
ties, which I ha:.r6 found in my negotiations with the ministers, 
have forced me to form a cO!:lpany, which will cause aid to reach 
your friends immediately by the way of Cap Francois. 20 
Naturally enough, this meager infol"'mation was very un-
satisfactory to Lee. More than this, he himself had hoped to 
play a principal role in the enterprise. 
From Beaumarchais he learned that Silas Deane had ar-
rived from the colonies ~1powered to treat _ith the rndnisters, 
who had refused steadily to permit his own appearance at Ver-
sailles. He learned that Beaumarchais had entered at once into 
negotiations with the aGent of Congress and that he, Arthur Lee, 
was bein~ consulted by no one. Lee, enraged and disapointed 
hurried to Paris, where he tried to brine about a quarrel between 
Deane and Beaumarchais. FailinG in this, he returned to London, 
anGered in his disappointment and furious s.r;ninst Deane. 2l To 
-
20 lb1Q., II, 87-88. 
21 ~., II, 8a. 
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a.venge himself he wrote to the Congress, that the 'two men were 
aereed to deceive both the French Government and the Americans 
by changing what the former meant to be a gratuitous offerinr. 
into a commercial speculation. 
These letters arriving in Philadelphia before any repor1 
from Deane, predisposed Congress--(two of whose members were 
brothers of Arthur Lee )--against t.he measures Deane was t.akine 
wi'th Beaumarchals. For the moment, however, no one interfered 
wi th their operations and both men were too intent. upon the all-
important matter in hand to speculate upon the possible results 
of 'the irritation of Doctor Dubourg, or the anger and jealousy 
of Arthur Lee. 22 
By the beginning of ltiarch, ten vessels of Roderigue 
Hortales at Cie. were floating towards AmEn~ica. The seventh of 
that month he announced that fact to VerGennes: "Never," he 
wrote, "has the commercial aftair been pushed with so much vieor , 
in spite ot obstacles ot every nature, which ha.ve been encounter-
ed. ~my God ~ive it good success. n23 
Beawnarchais, naturally, expected to receive very soon 
many expressions of gratitude trom Congress, as well as much 
• 
22 ~. 
23 ~., II. 124. 
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f;1!lryland and Vir[',inia tobacco. He did not even rece! va a reply 
to his letters. 24 Nevertheless. he continued to send out ships 
laden with supplies, all through the spring and summer, receiving 
trom his agents alone intormation of their safe arrival. 
The failure of Congress to ratify the conditions of-
tered by its commissioner would have brought to ruin the Commer-
cial house of Roderi~e Hortales et Cie, 1n spite of the subsidy 
of two millions with which it had been founded, bad not the Gov-
ernment again come to its assistance. 'rhough the ministers in 
general, and Vergennes in particular, never entirely deserted 
Beaumarchais, other and wholly different measures for aidinr: the 
Americans were now seriously occupying their attention. The 
colonies, in declaring themselves free from British rule, had 
forced upon France the necessity of coming to some definite 
decision. This she was slotl in doing. It was inevitable that 
she should take an active part in the strugeles. 'the measures 
necessary for the arming and equipping of her torces were already 
being discussed in her councils, while the nation, eone mad with 
enthusiasm, was urging her forward in the pathway, which could 
lead to nothinG but open wnr. 25 
24 ll2!s!. 




To be of service in eiving France a chance to hurt her 
rival in secret \'lithout beine forced to pay the penalty of making 
a wru." she could ill afford, was the aim whi ch prompted Beaumar-
chais in aiding the American colonies financially in the l~evolu-
tion. 
Underneath was the desire for notoriety and applause. 
The first concrete aim was accompli~led in 1776. The second was 
never fulfilled in America. Here he was never generally known 
even in name and never applauded, althourp he was sufficiently 
well known by the leaders of the Continental and later Coneresses 
to be thorou[';hly suspected as a self-seeking trickster. 26 
This was, in part, due to the prejudiced statements of 
Arthur Lee.- who made Beaumarchais' s acquaintance in London in 
1775, and to those of Dr. Dubourg of Paris. Both of these men wera 
rivals of Beaumarchais, the former for fame or popularity, the 
Intter for the commercial enterprise, which fell into his oppo-
nent f IS hands. Lee in his chagrin at not being able to claim that 
he had won the support of France, and his more or less sincere 
bewilderment over the secret dealinss ot the French ~overllment 
wi th Beaumarchais and the colonies, influenced the Continental 
Coneress directly. Dr. Dubourg influenced Benjamin Franklin, 
94 
whom he had met sometime before in England, and' welcomed to 
paris in 1776. 
To put it briefly, Beaumarchais in 1775 used to ques-
ion Arthur Lee adroitly about American conditions and, in the 
a1"ly days, when he was forming his vague schemes for commercial 
salines, he discussed them with Lee. Since Lee got the 1mpres-
ion then that the business firm was a mere envelope for the aid 
o be eiven to America by the French govel"nment, he always 
tfirmed thereafter that the colonies were not indebted to the 
irm ot Roderigue Hortales and Company. He could not influence 
ilas Deane, however, so he complained ot him to the Continental 
ongres8 with enoue;h force and grounds for that a~ent to be 1"e-
aIled from Paris. l.leanwhile, Dr. Dubourg on finding that Beau-
archais in some mysterious way was being made an unofficial tool 
t the French government in helping the colonies, sent a letter 
f remonstrance to Vergennes on the plea of Beaumarchais's lack 
r bUSiness capacity or experience and r~s alleged Urunorality. He 
ould not deter Vergennes from his plan nor force him to acknowl-
ee that it existed. but although V.-sennes and Beaumarchnis had 
y a laugh at Dr. Dubourg's jealous int~~tIons. they could not 
event his influenCing Franklin, and through hIm, as America's 
iss, practical man, ft influenCing all the proceedines of the 
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60ntinental Con~esa in regard to theil" dealinf~s with RoderiL'1.1e 
al . 27 Hort· es and Company. 
ot the three American commissioners with who!.'! Beau.llar-
chais had to deal, he made a favorable impression upon only one, 
Silas Deane. He hud shown himself thr0Ur";hout all his life very 
shrewd and successful in reading the minds, understanding the 
temper, ood influencing the ,judgments of his fellow Frenchmen. He 
did not seem to understand the American colonists, especially the 
Yankees. He did not even suspect the role he ou~ht to assume to 
gain their confidence. He could not realize that to these non-
theatre-goal's, a playwright· must be in close touch with the devil 
~imself • He could not have suspected that his facetious and un-
~usinesslike letters condemned him again and ac;t.dn ..... Lomenie, his 
~iographer, understood the character of the colonists better. 
Only imagine serious Yankees, who had nearly all been 
traders before becoming soldiers, receiving masses of car-
goes, which were frequently embarked by stealth durinG the 
night, and the invoices of which consequently presented some 
irregularities, and all this without any other letters of 
advice than the rather lantastic missives sigled with the 
romantic nEUlle ot Roderigue Hortales and Company in which 
Benumarchais mixed up protestations ot enthusiasm, offers of 
unlimited service and political advice, with applications for 
tobacco, indigo, or salt fish, and ended with such tirades as 
this one, whi ch we may take as typical: 
Gentlemen, consider my house as the head of all opera-
tions useful to your cause in Europe, and myself ~8 the most 






and a man profoundly filled with the respectful esteem with 
which I fu~ve the honor to be, 
Roderigue Hortalez and Company28 
Hazard has quoted this vivid and sympathetic explana-
tion from Lomenie for it seems to be the key to much of the mis-
understanding of Beaumal'cha,is's troubles with the Continental 




real merchant, was no fool. By l7n, he had corne to the 
understanding that the colonies would not pay their debt 
unless he appealed to something more than their honor. 
De Francy to obtain justice from Congress far the past, and pre-
vent his future cargoes from being gratuitously delivered. The 
new contract made with the United States in 177$ sounds thorough-
ly businesslike but frdoes not calm the troubled watera.. Shipments 
continued under its provisions but payment for them is not made b~ 
Congress." Beaumarchais'a efforts remained unappreciated and his 
financial outlays were not reL~bursed.29 
On February 6, 1778, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, 
and Arthur Lee.. as commissionE?rs of the Thirteen Colonies, con-
cluded a treay of alliance with the French government. The tr~ee 
articles, which are most important to this study, are Articles 
VI. VII and XI. 
28 Jb~d., 29-30. 







Article VI states: 
The lOst Christian KinG renounces forever the posses-
sion ot the Islands of' Bermudas as well as any part ot the 
continent of North America, which before the treaty of Paris 
in 176), or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to 
belong to the Crown ot Great Britain, or to the United Stateq 
heretofore, called British Colonies or which are at this 
time or ha~. lately beeUOunder the Power of the King and 
Crown of Great Britain.) 
Article VII states: 
If his Most Christian Majesty shall think proper to at-
tack any of the island situated in the Gulph at 14ex1co, or 
near that Gulph, \.qfl!ch are at present under the Power ot 
Great Britain, all the said Islestlin case of success, shall 
appertain to the Crown of France.~ 
Article n guarantees the possession at the French \'Jest 
~ndles to France "rorever trom the present time and against all 
~ther powers." The article states: 
The two Parties guarantee mutually from the present time 
and forever, against all other powers, to wit, the United 
States to his most Christian Majesty the present possessions 
ot the Crown of France in America as well as those which it 
may a.cquire by the f'utux'e Treaty of Peace: and his most 
Christian Majesty guarantees on his part to the United 
States, their liberty, Sovereignlty, and Independence abso-
lute, and unlimited, a.s well in l·{atters of Government as 
commerce and also their Possessions, and the additions or 
conquests that their Confederation may obtain during the war, 
from any of the Dominions now or heretofore possessed by 
Great Britain in North America, conformable to the fifth and 
)0 Miller, Treatiel at:lSl qther Interogt 1.Rnal ~ s:. Y!!. 
United §tijte§ at. M\eri\ca. ;Qpsumeats l::l&Q.: lZZ6-;l;8l,8, 38. 
31 1la.!!., 38. 
sixth articles above written, the ,"vhole as their Possessions 
shall be .fixed and assured to the Said States at th~ moment 
ot the cassD.tion ot their present v/ar with Enr;land.)2 
At the same time another agreement known as the Treaty 
pf Amity and Commerce was signed by the representatives of the 
itwo nations. 
The clauses of this proposed agreement contained ideas 
~ar in advance ot the exclusive system of commercial legislntion, 
~ith which every country was fettered in the eighteenth century. 
~e most important ~re the first two clauses. The first of 
~hese provided that the subjects of France were to pay no other 
~uties in American ports than Americans paid, and wero to enjoy 
all the rights and privileges in navigation and commerce between 
the two countries, which the Americans themselves enjoyed. 'fhe 
second clause secured these sarae rights to the citizens of the 
United States in the ports of France and any ''fest India Islands, 
which might be secured by France as a result of the war. 3) 
The proposed plan was adopted by the two nations in the 
!treaty of February 6, 1778. The treaty when si51ed, however, 
fContained two clauses, which, had they remained, would have been 
32 ~bid •• 39-40. 
33 George F. ZOOK, uProposals for a New Commercial 
Treaty Between France and the United States, 1776.1793," t:l0ut11 
Atlantic (~ty:terlx, 1909, VIII, 268. 
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of great importance to cO.nmercial interests. The first of these 
provided that no duty should ever be laid upon the exportation 
of molasses from the French \~est Indies to the United States. 
~n return for this favor, which would have been so important to 
ithe Northern States, it was ai"reed that no duties should be im-
posed upon any kind of merch..!indise exported from the United 
~tates to the vJest Indies. Since the policy of taxing exports 
Irrom the States was not contemplated, it seems as if the eonees-
~ion made by the Feench was a valuable eift. It was not so ro-
r;arded by Arthur Lee, one of the Ameri can commissioners, and 
~a1ph Izard, both prominent men trom the South, who were disposed 
1\10 think the bargain favored Northern interests at the expense 
pi all others. The opposition of these men was so bitter that it 
~as decided to sacrifice both exemptions, and the treaty as 
~inally ratified did not contain these two clauses.34 
FRENCH NAVAL ACTION IN 
THE \iiEST INDIES 
When the French government, at last, resolved to take 
an active part in the war, a fleet under Charles Henry Count 
d'Estaing, was sent out b~om Toulon on the 13th of April, 1778, 
with orders to attack any fleet bound to or from Amerioa. At 
the s arne time they prepared to send out another fleet from Brest, 
under Count d'Orvilliers. The first hostility took place off 
the coasts of Brittany, the A,tethW:;l, of Keppel's neet, having 
on the 17th of June begun the war by attacking the Bel~e Poule, 
n French vessel of equal force, commanded by the brave La Cloche-
terie, who distinguished himself in the first, to die fighting 
most gallantly in the last battle of the war. This led to a 
fiercely contested, but indeoisive action off Ushant, on the 
21st of July 1778, between the English fleet under Keppel, and 
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the French fleet under the Count dfOrvilliers. l 
Meanwhile the Count dfEstaing ran across the Atlantic 
and began hostilities on the 30th of June, by capturing an Englisl 
vessel off Bermuda. On the 5th of the next month, the frigate 
Engg,&eMte of his fleet took the English .frigate !lose, the first 
real capture in the war. An unfortunate delay prevented his 
blockading Howe in the Delaware and he appeared off Sandy Hool 
July 11, to be abandoned by pilots, and outgeneraled by Howe, who 
prevented d'Estaing, misled too by Tory pilots, trom entering 
when he might in fnct have sailed up to the city and closed the 
war. D'Estaing then devised a plan with Lafayette and Sullivan 
to take Rhode Island. He ran into Newport and compelled the 
English to destroy their vessels there. Just as operations were 
about to begin Howe appeared, DtEstaing went out to meet him. 
Howe avoided an action, a storm came on, d'Estaiugts fleet suf-
fered, and abandoning the seige of Newport to the grea.t dissatis-
faction of Sulliv(ID, he sailed to Boston to repair. 
Leaving Boston he allowed Hotham' s squadron from New 
York to go, almost before his eyes, to Barbadoes. Proceeding to 
Guadaloupe, in December he engaged Barrington, but failed to 
capture his small squadron, and saw his arms repulsed with loss 




The next year, having been reinforced by tour vessels 
under de Grasse, he reduced the islands of Saint Martin, St. 
Bartholomew, and St. Vincent. On the last day of June, he sailed 
from Fort Royal with twenty-five vessels of the line, and two 
frigates, and early in July, after a sharp action, reduced Grana-
da. On the sixth, a very sharp engagement took place between 
d'Estaing and Byron, in which the latter suffered severely. 
The next operation or Count d'Estaing was another attac~ 
on an English post in the United States. Savannah was assailed 
on the 9th of October, by American and French troops, the former 
under Lincoln, the latter led by d'Estaing in person. In spite 
of the valor of the allies, they were repulsed with heavy loss. 
Thus ended the naval and military campaign of d 'Estalng, from 
which the Americans had expected much and obtained nothing. 2 
The campaign carried on in the West Indies had no 
special effect on the progress of the war. D'Estaing was a man 
of much bravery and of some energy, but he could not handle ships 
with the skill of ane whose life had been spent on the sea. 
Little was accomplished for some months. D'Estaing certainly 
did not overestimnte his successes, and he was never afraid to 
tell the truth about himself. He wrote home in January, 1779, 
that he had gone from one misfortune to another, and the ling's 
2 Ibid., 15-17. 
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squadron had not even been able to retake Saint Lucia. "If I do 
not entirely succumb under the weight of misfortune, which has 
characterized the events of this ruinous cmnpaign, I am none the 
less filled with extreme regret not to have been more useful in 
the service of the King.") 
In the summer of 1779 he was somewhat more fortunate. 
The French captured Granada and Saint Vincent, and d'istaing 
defeated the English under Lord Byron, who was by no means as 
great an admiral as his nephew was a poet. Even then d'Estaing 
was criticized, and perhaps justly, because he did not utilize 
his victory to the utmost; apparently, if he had possessed greater 
talent as a sailor, he might have destroyed the English fleet. 
"If he had possessed as much sea-craft as bravery," wrote an 
officer, "we would not have allowed four disabled vessels to make 
their escape."1t 
The Count de Guichen, who succeeded to the command of 
the French fleet in the l¥est Indies, broug,ht Rodney to action, 
April 17, 1780, but the battle produced no result, and a sirnilarl~ 
indecisive action took place 14ay 19. 
) James Breck Perkins, France !.n the American Revolu-
tiQD. Boston, 1911, 271-272. 
It Ibid •• 273. 
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In l7g1, the Chevalier Destouches sent a part of his 
from Boston to the Chesapeake, under r.... de Tilly, who 
captured the RomulU§, and several transports, but most of the 
enenyts vessels ran up to Portsmouth. Destouches himself then 
sailed to the Chesapeake, and had a spirited action with Graves, 
in which he put three of the English vessels hoI'S de combat. 
De Ternay. who brought another French squadron across the Atlan-
tie, allowed an English squadron to escape from him, and died ot 
mortifica.tion soon after his arrival.; 
Such had been the main operations of the French navy 
American waters up to the time of the campaign of the Count de 
That such fleets were sent by both governments to opel' 
m the dangerous waters- of the West Indian Archipelago, and waste 
their strength on the reduction of petty islands, when a conti-
nent was at stake, is not easily explained. The time was spent 
in taking and retaking small and unimportant isles, the posses-
sion of which was of not strategic importance. In the war on 
the Continent, the operations at Newport and Savannah, both 
failures, and the operations of' Destouchas in the Chesa-
alone show the intervention of our transatlantic allies, 
5 Shea, The Operation gf. ~ French Fleet Under ~ 
~:;.o;;, de grAIl., 17-1iJ. 
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and it is clear that the assistance rendered by the French navy 
was of little moment, except in the fact that it gave occupation 
to all England's neets. 6 
Francois Joseph Paul de Grasse-liouville, Count de Gras-
se, Marquis de Tilly, Lieutenant-General des Armeas Navales was 
born in 1723; but of his earlier career, even the bi ography pub-
lished by his son gives us no particulars. At the commencement 
of the war with ~~gland brought on by the American Revolution, he 
~ was captain of the Robaste, and had been in active service, ap-
" ~.( .............. ~ 
parently in her, since 1775. ~ith that vessel he took an active 
part in the naval enga,gament f01.41ht off Quessant in July t 1778. 
In the following year, still in the same vessel, he sailed as 
"chet-d'escadre", or commodore, from Brest with four ships of the 
line, and anchored 1n the road of Fort Royal, February 20, 1779. 
He shared in the triumphs and reverses of d'Estaing's campaign, 
ftl in the reduction of Granada, in the seige of Savannah, after 
1;, \fhich he sailed to the\iest Indies with a portion of the fleet. 
i:ta Here he distinguished him~elf in 1780, under de Guichen, in his 
engagements with Rodney, rescuing the §Rhmo and Artesi;en from a 
superior English :force. Declining the corrunand of the squadron on 
the ground of health, he returned to France, where he wa.s raised 
by the king to the rank of lieutenant-general or admiral, and 
6 Ibid., 18. 
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invested with the command of the neet in the \/est Ind! es, which 
d'Estaing and de Guichen had hitherto directed with jud~ent, 
though not with brilliant success. The elevation of de Grasse 
gave offense to many officers in the navy, and involved him in 
difficulties which ultimately dimmed by a fateful reverse, the 
!laurels won in the earlier part of his naval campaign. 7 
The West Indies were the chief object of de Grasse's 
~rui8e, and any expedition to the United States was regarded as 
pi secondary interest. As a matter of fact, the fleet accomplish-
~d little during its first stay among the islands, and oet with s 
~erious disaster the following year, while the expedition to the 
phesapeake ended a long and momentous contest. 8 
The King's neet, comma.nded by Lieutenant-General Count 
~e Grasse-Tilly, set sa.il on Thursday, M<~ch 22, 1781, with a 
ponvoy of two hundred and fifty ships valued at thirty million 
~ivres.9 
The following accoWlt of the action of the French fleet 
~n the West Indies is based on "A Journal of the Cruise of the 
7 Ibid., 20-21. 
g Perkins, France in the Amer!cga gevo*ution, 357. 
-9 Shea, Operations ~ the French Fleet Uader ~ COunt 
~ Gra§§e, 30. 
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Fleet of His Nost Christian Majesty, under the command of the 
Count de Grasse-Tilly, in 1781 and 1782, by the Chevalier de 
Goussencourt. ft edited by J. D. G. Shea in the book, Ihe O~rat1ons 
2! the French Fleet Unde£ th! C2Hnt ~ Qra§s~ !n 1181-1Z82. 
On Sunday, April 29, 1781, a French fleet of twenty 
ships of the line sighted an English fleet of eighteen ships 
of the line and five frigates off the shores of Martinique. 
The French vessel, the LinSHeQgc, fired on the enemy, but 
missed. Havine seen the strength of the French. and losing 
hope of capturing any vessels, the English came on a tack 
similar to the French. 'fhe French eave chase, but were 
becalmed. Four English vessels ran afoul of each other and 
became separated from the fleet. Some of the French com-
manders thought they should be captured but 1-1. de Grasse 
paid no attention to it. No other officer would take the 
responsibility. The French then anchored at Fort Royal, 
~Iartinique. All efforts to eneHge Admiral Hood failed •. The 
action lnsted five and a half hours. The French lost one 
officer killed, one dangerously wounded, and one hundred and 
fifty men killed or wounded. Hood tried in vain to enter St. 
LUCia, but was prevented from doine so by the French. Rod-
ney was then engaged in pillaging St. Eustatius. The French 
pursued the En~lish ineffectually for three days. The tact 
that M. de Grasse let four vessels escape which might have 
been capture led to a dispute at St. Pierre between several 
French naval officers. This was the origin of an ill feeling 
that afterwards prevailed in the fleet. 
The chase of the English having taken them quite some 
distance to the leeward, it took the French until May 6 to 
regain the island of' Martinique. They set sail on the eighth 
for the channel of St. Lucia. On May 15, they anchored in 
the roadstead of St. LUCia, in Gras Islet Bay, where the 
battery kept up an ineffectual fire. 
On the morning of the 16th, the lone boats and barges 
went ashore to bring otf the troops there and the prisoners 
they had taken amounting to one hundred and fifty men and two 
officers. M. de Bouille saw that the siege of Morne Fortune 
would require an army of twenty thousand men. The English 
made no greater opposition to their reembarkation than they 





At'daybreak on the 29th, having discovered Tobago on 
one side, and seven English vessels and five frigates on 
the other, the French g'we chase but to no purpose. In the 
evening the Atgrettl asked leave to give chase, and took a 
brig of ten guns. 
On the 31st, being near Tobago, the French sighted 
several ships. They hoisted the English flag and the ships 
threw themselves into their hands. A slaver, with two hun-
dred and fifty negroes on board, and several smaller vessels 
were captured in the same way. 
Late in the afternoon of June 2, the fleet anchored off 
Tobago. This island had surrendered the previous evening to 
1>1. De Bouilla, who had landed with eight hundred men three 
days before. The capture of Tobago cost the French only 
three men. They took ten officers and three hundred and 
sixty men, and left a garrison of eighteen hundred men, arms 
and money. 
The next afternoon they set sail again, the G.orie~ 
and the St, E§iirtt haVing discovered the enemy r!eet.t 
was Rodney com ng to the relief of Tobago, but learning that 
it was taken, he would not haza:cd an action that could re-
sult only in mutual slaughter, because the fleets were of 
equal force. M. de Grasse. on the contrary, SOUtt>.t to en-
gage the English; but being to leeward, he could not overtak 
them. 
The chase of the English having made them fall consider 
ably to leeward, on the morning of June e, the }!'rench admits. 
asked for the bearings of several vessels because little at-
tention had been paid to the route they had taken. At noon 
they discovered that they were near Granada, where they 
anchored on the tenth of June. 
On June 13, the fleet again set sail and lay to before 
St. Vincent, where they waited for the general of the troops, 
who had gone there the day before. 
On July 5, the fleet and its convoy of over two hundred 
vessels set sail tor Granadina in search of the HectQt and a convoy of fifteen sa11. After making the junction. t ey 
steered for Cape Francois, while the Enr~ish, coming from 
Barbadoes. steered for Jamaica, from which Uodney sailed 
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On the 14th, Commander de Glandevese was detached with 
four ves~e+s to cruise around-St. Domingo and the small 
isles adJacent to the leeward, and to relieve the Astion-
naare which was blackaded by two English ships of the line 
an two frigates. l 
The following account of the preparations for the York-
town affair is written in diary form and is based on tlA Journal 
of the Cruise of the Fleet of His Most Christian Majesty, Under 
the Command of the Count de Grasse-Tilly, in 1781 and 1782 by 
the Chevalier de Goussencourt J rt edited by J. D. G. Shea in the 
book, ~ QR.erat~oni RL the lren"ch Fl;.eet Ungar th~ CSYDt Pi. 
Gra~§g !a 17.8~-12~2. 
July 30th, ordeC to hold ourselves in readiness to sail 
and to sh ip cannons J mortars, and all necessary to make a 
r(~gular siege. The same day we took on board our vessel the 
regiments of Gatinon, now Royal Auvergne, Agenois, Touraine, 
and a detachment of ~uzunts legion. 
August 5th, all being ready, the signal was given to 
unmoor. and on the 6th at 4 A.M., to loose sail. Our fleet 
numb~..red twenty-four vessels, and the wonder is trat· every-
body, the Enelish included, knew where we were going, while 
we had not even conjecture as to the opera.tion that our 
admiral was about to take. 
On the 7th the commander, de Glandevese, who had 
sailed around t~e island to leeward, joined us with the 
Bl;f~oiRe and the Hect~r. The Ast!onnair~, which had come 
W1t tle commander's ive vessels. anchored on the 8th at 
the cape. 










On the 10th, the light squadron gave chuse to the Engli 
frigate which had chased the l!.!. and forced her to put in at 
the Hole St" Nicolas, after sh-shad fought three times; first 
with a frigate, which she sunk; next with a fifty gun ves-
sel, which she cut up considerably by a maneuvre which ex-
cited the admiration of the enemy. 
On the 11th, we entered the old channel and took in a 
Spanish coast pilot comine from BaracaoL a town lying on the 
northern coast of the island of Cuba. The passage of this 
channel is justly considered a very dangerous spot. We were 
so happy as to spend t~xee days in the narrowest part of the 
pass, wInch is surrounded by reefs on every Side, experienc-
ing an unsupportable contrariety of winds. 
At this period we flattered ourselves that we should be-
hold the superb city of Havanna, the capital of the island of 
Cuba, and the richest and strongest place in America; the 
Spaniards having added considerably to its fortifications 
since the last war. The A~s:@tte alone went there, and 
brought ofr tour millions, which served as an excuse for the 
seventeen men of war there! not to accompany us on the ex-
pedition \'{c had on hand. s it not a shwne for these vessels 
to be rotting two years in port? It is only a nation as 
cowardly as the Spaniard that can wallow so in inaction, 
leaving its allies to bear the brunt of the war • 
On the Hith we lay to off M~\tanzas, three leagues trom 
that town, and stout thirty from Havanna. \ve sent our pilots 
ashore. and entered the Bahama channel, into which the cur-
rents carried us. At this point, being in order J we learned 
that the projected expedition was to the Chesapeake. Here 
the charming maritime ill-temper displayed itself in all its 
beauty, for they closed the council-chamber door on the 
gentlemen ot the Royal Auvergne, commanded by rei. de TourVille 
who could not help taking up the silly remarks they passed 
on the Count d'Estaing. 
On the 24th, we took three English vessels; one of 
which, commanded by a lieutenant in the navy, carried sixteen 
six-pounders and eight eighteen-pound howitzers. • • • TIle 
smaller ot the other two was carrying to England a general 
officer who had commanded· at Savannah and Charleston, which 
he had left a week before J and who enjoyed the highest repu-
tation. All these vessels, and those subsequently taken off 











On the 28th, the fleet anchored three leaeues from the 
roadstead of the Chesapeake, according to the advice of 
the coast pilots whom we had on board. We had not yet seen 
any land, which here lies very low. 
On the 29th. we anchored in three columns. in the 
entrance of the roadstead, after chHsinr:; a number of vessels 
that we could not make out. You will not perhaps be as-
tonished to learn in what security the English live. Having 
anchored and displayed our flag, '\tIe were approached by a 
boat in which was one of the principal citizens of Virginia, 
who asked where Lord Hodney was. The sailors on deck hailed 
and one of them who spoke English well, told them to come on 
board, ~lich they did at once. But what was their surprise 
to see only infantry in white uniforms. They were taken 
to the main cabin where we WHre at dinner, and where the 
captain informed them that they were prisoners, ordering 
them to be well treated. The boat was taken, and found to 
contain excellent melons and many other rifreshments, 
whi ch were eaten in honor of Lord Rodney_ 
The greatest French contribution to the success of the 
American Revolution was the naval support which the French fleet, 
under the Count De Grasse gave to the land forces, under \jashing-
ton and Rochambeau in the Battle of Yorktown. This action will 
be discussed later in Ylis study. 
CHAPTER VI 
TIm i{OLE OF TIm FRENCH ~lEST INDIAN 
FLEET IN TIll; SUlL-tENDER AT 
YORKTOWN 
Before the campaign at Yorktown the French vlest Indian; 
fleet accomplished very little in a military way. It served 
merely to keep the British fleet occupied and away £rom colonial 
shores. 
A large share of the credit for the capture of Yorktown 
be~ongs to the Count de Grasse who performed his part with great 
exactitude. He prevented the Enl~ish from relieving Cornwallis, 
and brought an important reenforcement to the land forces. If 
his fleet had not arrived promptly and remained until the work 
was done the capture of Yorktown would have been impossible. 
Uochambeau wrote in the spring and early summer telling 
of the needs of the Ameri can army and asked for pronpt cooperation 
against the common foe. De Grasse proceeded to take energetic 
steps to answer these calls for help. There W::1.S no definite plan 
worked out for him. He acted upon his own responsibility in 
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transporting a body of soldiers to Vire1nia to the West Indies. 
He had to negotiate with the Spaniards who had not interest in 
the American allies of France. He even had to risk the disappro". 
at of his awn government. 
When he arrived at Cape Haytien on July 16 he found the ,il 
letters ot Rochambeau and the French minister stating the impor-
tance of prompt aid to the American cause. At once he tried to 
meet these requests to the best ot rds ability. A large force 
of French troops was stationed at Saint Domingue. but the French 
government had agreed that they should be at the disposition of 
Spain and were to be used tor an expedition to Florida. The 
Spanish admiral was not ready for the Florida campaign and wanted 
to postpone it until winter. De Grasse took advantage of this 
and asked the French governor to lend him these troops in the 
meantime. This was a bold step. If the troops he borrowed were 
not returned to Saint Domingue in time to embark for Florida when 
the Spanish asked tor them, de Grasse had to incur the risk of 
severe censure by his own government. He was able to persuade 
the governor that these troops could be spared for two Dr three 
months. 
It was decided that thirty-four hundred men could be 
spared from Saint Domingue until November, although this was not 
the five thousand suggested by Rochambeau. They were borrowed 









returned by that time. Since Spanish ships were to keep guard 
of the island, the Spanish indirectly were rendering assistance 
1 to the colonists whose allies they had refused to become. 
De Grasse found it hard to obtain any money, and the 
amount Rochambeau asked for was utterly impossible to raise. He 
tried, unsuccessfully, to borrow from some of the mercl~ts at 
Santo Domingo, even though he offered to pledge his own estate 
as security for repayment. He then went to Havana to see if he 
would be more successful there. He found seventeen Spanish men-
of -war lying peaceably at that port, with the customary inact! v-
ity of Spanish warfare. Perkins quotes an earlier historian, in 
this way: 
Is it not a shame tor these vessels to lie rotting two years 
in port? It i8 only a nation as cowardly as the Spanish 
that can wallow so in inaction, leaving its allies to bear 
all the brunt of the war.~ 
If the fleet remained inactive, the Spanish furnished 
de Grasse tour million livres in cash, which was more useful than 
the cooperation of their ships. It furnished the needs of his 
fleet and left a large surplus which he gave IUS associates in 
1 Perkins, Fteoc! la ¥he 6meriggn R~vohHt~9D, 376-378. 
2 Shea, rr:he O'2E§t~" .2t .1al! flinch Fleet UDder the 
COHnt .9.! graljUUh J& 1281-1282 , 3. 
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America. Having obtained the necessary money and having the 
fleet off Havana. their destination was publicly announced. 
After a voyar,e of twenty-three days, de Grasse's fleet 
anchored off the roadstead of Chesapeake Bay on August 28. The 
The troops were landed at Jamestown Island on September 4 and 5. 
Cornwallis made no attempt to prevent the landing. An enterpris-
ing general might have attacked the French in the confusion of 
disembarking, but the British left them undisturbed. They joined 
the forces under. Lafayette, who now had an army of seven thousand 
men. 3 
In the meantime, Clinton was puzzled as to how to meet 
Washington's tl~eat against New York. In a letter \iritten to 
Germain in London, Clinton remarked that, since Admiral Graves 
had taken the fleet away from New York, he would write to Admiral 
, 
Rodney, the British commander in the West Indies. to watch de 
Grasse. He feared that the French fleet would slip away from 
the West Indies and come north to cooperate with Washington in 
an attack on New York. Clinton adds this prophetic remark: 






Enemy remain only a few weeks superior at aea, our insular and 
detached situation will become very critical."4 One must under-
stand "insular" in its older meaning of "isolated." He complains 
to Germa.in that he has not heard from London for tour months. No 
wonder he felt "insular." 
In the early summer of 1781 the royal navy had many 
notable admirals, but none was available at New Yark. Hyde, 
Parker, Kempenfelt, Darby, and Shaldhamwere kept busy defending 
the homeland because ot threats upon the coast of England by 
France and Holland. The next most important work was in the west 
Indies. Admirals Uodney and Hood were responsible for defending 
the Sugar Islands, where so many English families had heavy in-
vestments. Besides, they had to watch de Grasse, New York was 
relatively unimportant. 
Admiral Rodney at the West India station, as was ex-
plained earlier, had been busy for some time with the combined 
pleasure and duty ot looting the Dutch island of St. Eustatlus. 
The consequences of this act proved very annoying because Rodney's 
ruthlessness made no distinction between British and enemy goods. 
vllien he finally sent thirty shiploads of plunder to England, the 
French naval commander, La ),!otte-Picquet, dashed out from Brest 
•• 
4 Randolph G. Adams, "A View of Cornwallis' Surrender 
at Yorktown," 'manicaD Historical ReView, New York, 1931 XXXVII, 
29. 
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and captured twenty-six of the convoy. Therefore, Rodney had 
other things on his mind besides watching de Grasse. 
Rodney learned, on July 7, that de Grasse, who was 
supposed to be at Martinique, had left there with thirty-six war-
ships. His informant did not know where they were going. Adams 
gives this account of' Rodney's attempt to justify his actions: 
In order to clear himself afterwards, Rodney said that 
upon receipt of' this intelligence he had specifically 
warned the admiral at New York that de Grasse had sailed 
for Cape Francois (to pick up more troops and supplies), 
and was thence bound for the Chesapeake; therefore let 
the adrniral at New York beware. If any such dispatch had 
actually been sent, and had actually been received at New 
York, both Graves and Clinton might have been forewarned. 
But they were not-for two reasons. First t Uodney never 
sent such a message. ~;ihat he really wrote on July 7 was 
that de Grasse had left )furtlnique, that Rodney did not 
know whether he had Wone to Cape Francois, but that he was 
destined to sail to America," without speCifying the 
Chesapeake. This made a great deal of difference, because 
Clinton and Graves expected de Grasse to come north. but the 
word nAmerica," instead of "Chesapeake" would simply confirm 
Clinton and Graves in their opinion that de Grasse was com-
ing to cooperate with \vashington in the attack on New York. 
The second reason that Clinton had not been forewarned was 
this: the dispatch, even in its vastly different form, was 
entrusted to Captain Wells of the sloop SJa~9U. Wells 
reached New York safely, but as the dispatch was addressed 
to the Admiral, and Graves was absent cruising off Boston, 
Wells started to folloH him, when, off the coast of Long 
Island; an American privateer moved into sight. Wells 
could not resist the temptation to punish the impudent Yankee 
skipper. The result was preCisely opposite of what Wells 
intended, because tl~ee more uapudent Yankees sailed up, and 
\'Iel18, carrying important dispatches, which he had no rl.ght 
to jeopardize, was compelled to destory them and beach the 
SW§btgw on Long Island. Graves did not receive Rodney's news 
unti six weeks after it was sent.' 
5 Ibi,q. J 33-34. 
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It has been obsorved that Rodney received 1nf' ormation 
to the effect that de Grasse was bound for Santo Domingo. Two 
days later Hood was ordered by Rodney to take eight ships to 
Antiqua to refit and to sail with them to reenforce Graves at 
New York, because de Grasse was probably on the way to join 
Barras at Newport. Soon after this Rodney became very ill, and 
he ordered Admiral Drake to take command in the Leeward Islands 
while he returned to England for his health, Hood was sent to 
New York. vihen Rodney learned that a convoy of merchant vessels 
bound for Jamaica was nearby, he ordered Hood to take twenty-four 
ships, instead of eight, and conduct the convoy safely to Jamaica 
before going north to join Graves, A week later. Rodney, deceived 
by some discontented British subjects, sent Admiral Drake on a 
wild goose chase to Saint Lucia with six ships to attack a French 
~orce that did not exist. Rodney had only himself to blame if 
~is conduct at St. Eustatius turned those who might otherwise have 
~een loyal against him. He was forced by illness to return to 
6 ~ngland on August 1, 
It is probably fair to say that the British had no real 
~dea of the Franco-American plans~ They were as puzzled as the 
~mericans in regard to de Grasse t s purpose. They thought that the 
tFrench admiral might come north. but they had no idea when or with 
6 Ibig., 34-35. 
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",ha.t numbers. Unfortunately for them, they assU!.'led that de Grasse 
~as bringing only a few vessels. Clinton should have been think-
~ng this out. On July 2$ he sent a routine dispatch to Germain 
~aying t~~the understood that de Grasse had left Martinique and 
~ight be expected off New York at any time, but, since Hodney 
~as following him, there was nothing to worry about. 
Admiral Hood, off Antigua, received some real news on 
~ugust 3. Just before he sailed for England, Rodney had received 
r.he information that thirty American pilots for the Delaware and 
lliesapeake had arrived at Cape Francois, the French sector or 
anto Domingo. It was there that de Grnsse was going. Rodney 
nformed Hood without comment. Hood, seeing how important this 
as, sent the sloop, Astiv" to warn Graves at New York. Luck 
'as with the Americans, for the Astive was captured and taken into 
hiladelphia. The significance of pilots for the Chesapeake was 
ost.7 
In mid-August Clinton, somewhat ~ecovered in spirits, 
u~~ested to Graves that, since de Grasse could not possibly ar-
ive for another week or ten days, they might try again to attack 
ewport. Upon receivine this suggestion Graves decided that two 
hips needed repairs. He believed that the story of de Grasse's 
7 Ibiq., 35-37. 
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coming was merely the product of a "heated imagination." Even if 
de Grasse did come, it would be only with a few vessels to replaCE 
those which Barras was sending back to France to refit. Clinton 
might get something done at last when Graves's ships were re-
paired. On August 18. he had three thousand men ready to embark, 
!. and could go to llewport on twenty-four hours notice. However, it 
I 
took two days more to repair the ships. Then, on August 20, 
Clinton had an attack of blindness. 8 
On August 19, Adjutant General Delancy received three 
dispatches from the British scout Marquard. In the first, writ-
ten in the morning, he announced that he had positive infornmtion 
from one of his woman agents that the French had struck camp and 
were marching for North Castle and that Washington was preparing 
to cross the Hudson at Dobbs Ferry. The second dispatch, written 
in the afternoon, confirmed the first but could not euess which 
way the Franco-American forces were going. The third dispatch, 
written when the rank'lle informant reached r,1arquard's headquarters 
in the evening, was equally confusing as to why and where Wash-
ington was going. On AUEust lS, Lieutenant-Colonel Wurmb of the 
Jagers had positive information that "an American womant who was 
the mistress of a French officer of distinction, had been in-
structed to go to Trenton."9 Thus, although he had been warned 
g ~bid., 37-38. 













from two directions, one of which was rather close to the French 
high command, Clinton took no action. On the twentieth, Delancey 
received three more notes. Wurmb reported that the Americans 
had certainly crossed the Hudson. According to Marquard, rebel 
baggage and heavy artillery were going across. Captain Beckwith 
could not be certain what the Americans were planning, but he was 
sure that their whole plan had suddenly undergone a drastic 
change. From this it seems that the British intelligence was 
working, but not very well. The information made very little 
impression at headquarters.10 
Graves went on repairing his ships. On August 21, he 
reported to Clinton that he had just heard that Barras was pre-
paring to leave Rhode Island. Clinton reported that he had re-
liable information that de Grasse w~s bringing only a tew ships 
north. Neither Graves nor Clinton had any idea of Barras's des-
tination. It seems odd that they could not have realized that 
Barras was goin~ to join de Grasse. By August 22, Cornwallis, 
having reached Yorktown, was so busy digging in that he informed 
Clinton that he could spare no troops tor another six weeks. 
Lord Cornwallis was alarmed because or three factors. First, 
Wayne and Lafayette had in some way been reenforced. Second, 
a mob of Loyalist refugees. who hud been following him trom 
10 Ibid., 39-40. 
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portsmouth, were consuming his supplies more rapidly than he 
iked. Third, although Clinton had sent three thousand entrench-
ne tools south, Cornwallis's engineer's records showed only nine 
nmdred and ninety-two while less than four hundred could actually 
~e located by the storekeeper.ll 
Admiral Hood arrived with his ships of the British 
lest India squadron on August 24. He had seen nothing of de 
Prasse and did not know where he was. The British probably were 
~ongratulating themselves that Hood arrived at New York before 
~e Grasse. Marquard, the scout, sent word to Delancey that the 
~rench had now crossed the Hudson, that for three successive 
~ights they had moved their camp, and that Washington was carry ... 
~ng flatboats, for what purpose, the scout did not guess. l2 
Graves decided that, with the addition of Hood's fleet, 
) 
" 
J. is force was superior to the French. On August 31 J he put out 
! t 0 sea to seek and punish Barras's lit tle fleet, even though it 
~ ight have been joined by a few vessels from de Grasse's West 
f ~dia squa.d.1"on. Cornwallis, that same day t learned that between 
~i 
f' hirty and forty ships had come inside the capes of the Chesa-
t eake, but he did not say what they were. 
11 12!!!.; 40. 
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Clinton was certain that Cornwallis need not fear the 
French fleet because Hood and Graves would talte care of it. 
These two brilliant admirals, however, tailed and failed badly. 
Believing de Grasse had only a few ships, they found him to have 
a fleet that outnumbered the combined fleets of Graves and Hood. 
A naval battle was fought off the capes ot Virginia on Septem-
ber 5. Some authorities have called this battle "indecisive." 
However J Adams believes that few na.val actions in history have 
decided more. Graves, hruldling his fleet badly, got only a part 
of his force into the action and was severely damaged by de Gras-
se. Both fleets maneuvered for position after the fight and it 
seems that Graves was actually nearer to Yorktown than de Grasse 
at one time. Graves put out to sea instead of taking advantaee 
of his position to rush in and rescue Cornwallis. HoOd lost 
contact ~th de Grasse and, on September 10, wrote to Graves 
asking him if be knew where the French fleet might be.l '; Graves 
didn't know either. It wa.s three days before he replied that the 
French fleet was at anchor in"the Chesapeake and asked Hood's 
opinion as to what to do with the fleet. Hood's reply was equalll 
futile: "Sir Samuel would be very glad to send an opinion, but 
he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentable state 
13 ~., 42. 
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we have brought ourselves. n14 It was decided at a council of 
war, held at sea, that, because of the damaged state of the 
fleet, the coming equinoxial storms, and the impossibility of 
helping Cornwallis, the British £leet should return to New York 
to refit. Because Barras had gone into the Chesapeake with the 
Newport squadron and de Grasse was stronger than ever, it was 
impossible to help Cornwallis now. Now Graves understood why 
Barras had left Rhode Island. 
While Clinton waited, it took Graves two weeks to 
reach New York after the action orf the Chesapeake. In the mean-
time, Commodore Affleck represented the navy at a council of war 
called by Clinton on September 17. The somewhat hysterical na-
ture of this conference may be detected by reading between the 
lines of the minutes. Affleck wanted to take five thousand men 
and convoy them in a single ship of the line to Yorktown. How 
he proposed to get this last hope through the entire French fleet 
does not appear. General Leslie, frantic at the delay, wanted 
something, anything, done at once. General Robertson, objecting 
[to haste, sugGested that they wait not only tor Graves, but for 
~he added naval forces being sent from England under Admiral 
~igby. The traitor Arnold was called in to another war council 
w-hich was called the next day. It was agreed that they should 
wait for Graves, Hood, and Digby, since Cornwallis had eight 
14 ~.f 43. 
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thousand men with provisions for ten thousand to the end of 
October. On the fifteenth, Graves reported that his damaged 
fleet Was on its way back to Sandy Hook. He added sadly that 
the French controlled the Chesapeake, and that nothing could be 
gotten into Cornwallis except at nig)lt. His fleet was huddled 
together for fear that the French cruisers might cut out the 
straggling vessels. 15 
Graves finally arrived back in New York with hLs badly 
damaged fleet on September 19. It certainly was in no condition 
to set sail immediately convoying troops to Cornwallis and to 
attempt to break through the entire French fleet in the process. 
Because it took ten days to determine what repairs were needed, 
it was not until the twenty-third that ten ships were sent to the 
yards and work begun. That same day another council of war for 
the general officers was called by Clinton. They rencl~d the 
rather obvious conclusion that the only thing that could save 
Cornwallis was a direct move by the army and navy. This 
necessitated the calling of another council at which the flag as 
well as the general officers were to be present. They met the 
next day and decided to put the troops on the "Kingts ShiPS." 
that is, the royal navy not the transports, and send word to Corn 
wallis that they would start south by October 5. 
15 I21£!., 43-44. 
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Admiral Dibgy arrived that same day at Sandy Hook with 
a small naval reenforcement which included Prince \li'illiam Henry, 
destined to become King William IV of England. Almost a week 
after he returned to New York, Graves discovered that there was 
no lumber with which to repair his ships. Clinton had to send 
over the wood which was to be used for barracks at st. Lucia. 
Then Graves found that he did not have the combustibles to pre-
pare fire ships, so Clinton had to open up the army ordnance 
stores. On the wenty-sixth, Prince valliam landed and the next 
two days were wasted in parties, parades, receptions, and 
speeches. 
A letter from Cornwallis stating that if he were not 
speedily relieved, Clinton might expect to hear "the worst,ff 
reached New York on the twenty-third. Clinton interpreted this 
to mean that Cornwallis would be forced to retreat out of harm's 
way. Three days later it occurred to him that the "worst" might 
have another meaning, and he called a council of his general 
officers. They expressed the opinion that the "worst" rooant that 
Cornwallis could not retreat, but would be forced to surrender. 
Clinton sugeested a raid into New Jersey toward Philadelphia in 
his anxiety to do something. This plan was wisely rejected on 
the groun~6that the army should not be away when the ships should 
be ready. 
16 Ib14., 45. 
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Di'by and Hood did not want the army and navy putting 
out to sea without some idea of what they were to do when they 
re:l;ched Virginia. Therefore, they sought out Clinton and began 
asking questions. Digby wanted to know if the navy were merely 
to take the army within striking distance of Cornwallis and then 
retire to a safe distance. Clinton rejected any such notion, 
for how was he to feed that army without the fleet? Diiby asked 
again, how was the fleet to get out if by some miracle they 
could get through de Grasse's augmented fleet? They also doubted 
if Graves would be able to sail on October 5 as he had promised. 
Clinton called another council to discuss these points. They 
agreed on only one thing, that, since Graves vlou1d not be ready 
by October 5, Cornwallis should be notified to that effect. 
Graves, confirming their fefU"s, said that he would not be ready 
before October 8. 
Adams gives this picture of the discord at British 
headquarters at New York: 
Captain \Jilliam Cornwallis of H. M. seventy-four gun ship 
~ was storming around because Graves's delays were 
rmperillng his brother, Lord Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown. 
Major Darner, Germain's friend,'was one of the officers who 
had been embarked, disembarked. B.nd reembarked until he was 
decidedly acid in his comments 011 Clinton's incapacity and 
his failure to anticipate Washington's plans. \'Jll1iam Smith 
wrote that Clinton was a domineering trifler surrounded by 
a staft of third-rate sycophants. Arnold was disgruntled on 
many counts--the more so when he saw his advice being ig-
nored by the British uS much as it ever had been by the 
Americans. Old General Robertson relieved the tension by 
12$ 
being "abandoned to Frivolity--he has Parties of Girls in 
the Fort Garden in the midst of his own Fears, and the 
anxieties of this Hour." V. 
Clinton called another council of the flag and general 
officers on September 30, when he learned that Graves could not 
sail betore October 8. It was agreed that. even though the 
whole French fleet were between them and Cornwallis, they must 
sail. The question was when. It became apparent that they would 
again be delayed until October 12. l'il11en the navy men withdrew, 
the army men held a separate council a,t which it was decided to 
inform Cornwallis of the ne\1 delays without telling the navy that 
they had done so. 
While the Americans tightened their lines about York-
town, the work on the ships at New York went on. On October 3. 
t'/ashington was within eleven hundred yards of Cornwallis's works. 
vilien Graves discovered that there wa.s no powder £1 t for use on 
board his own flagship, the London, Clinton again patiently 
opened up the army stores. 
The next day, Clinton and Graves got into an unfortu-
nate argument. Graves began it by reopening an old question of 
whether the Sixty-ninth regiment belonged to the army or the navy 
17 lh!a., 45-46. 
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GrtlVes declared that 1 t was needed tar r:kvine duty Otl Hood' a 
squadron. while Clinton lnsisted it was his. Then Graves aaked 
what was to be done with the troops embarked on the war vessela 
if it wel"a 1r!lpossible to relievo Corn\iallis and Hood should have 
to roturn to his Hest India. station. Was Hood supposed to take 
with him the troops carried on his vcssela? tallving the West 
Indies unguarded meant cr1t:toi&"':1 in P ",liament iro.-n the British 
investing Clt18Se.h This seemed to bo ther Graves more than Hood, 
but then Hood. in Adam' 8 opinion, was probC'lbly an abler rm:ln than 
his super1or.18 
On Octobel" 7. Clinton. writing to Graves, suggested 
that it Hood had to return to the l1est Indies in a hurry, empty 
transports should tallow the fleet at sea. It they were unable 
to relieve Cornwallis. then Hood was to transfer the troops to 
t.lle transport at Gaa.. Graves said he wOL,ld present the mattel'" to 
a meeting ot f'lllJ~ officers the next day. Digby wld Clinton de-
cided that a meeting of' flag and (~neral officers WMS lleCeasar'1 
to iron out this difticulty. Digby was to sec Graves and asl~ him 
to cc)me to anny hendc.,us'rters the ne..'Ct day tor such a !!1eeting. 
Graves, apparently angered at whnt he thOU£"Jlt was Clint.on· s 
attez'Jpt to order hitt around. h:1.d called a meetinr; of his awn flag 
, P 1 , , F d 
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officers for that day. On the morning of the meeting, he sent a 
very stiff letter, written in the third person, in whioh he said 
to Clinton, "Don't wait the meeting for me, as I shall not be 
there. ftl9 
At this meeting, even Hood was convinced by Graves's 
behavior that he was going to make trouble and create difficul-
ties for the army. Hood solved the problem of the troops on 
board his ships by saying that the relief of Cornwallis was of 
primary importance, and that the West Indies would have to take 
care of themselves. In reporting to a friend, Hood wrote this 
to a friend: 
I own to you I think very meanly of· our present commanding 
officer (Graves). I know he is a "cunning" man, he may be 
a good theoretical man, but he is certainly a bad practical 
one, and most clearly proved himself on the fifth of last 
month to be unequal to the conducting ot a great squadron. 20 
Clinton did not answer Graves's letter until the next 
day, when he answered with tact and civility that the apparent 
offense was a misconception. 
Another council of generals was called to take up the 
questi on of what to do with an army and a fleet which the French 
would not per'mit to reach Yorktown. It was decided that they 
would land either at Newport News or on I\iJondayt S Paint. on the 
19 ~., 47. 
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north shore ot the York river. An examination of t'he map wot."ld 
show that it was impossible to land at either place. During the 
meeting, a shift in the wind made it impossible to sail, even if 
Graves had been ready. 
The Americans were within six hundred yards of Corn-
wallis's works on October 11. They cut that down to three hun-
dred yards on the twelfth. Heavy artillery was subjecting 
Yorktown to a furious bombardment. Clinton wasted the fourteenth 
in writing Cornwallis of his plans for landing the troops. He 
assured Germain that the army of relief had already embarked. 
On October 15, the fleet was still windbound at New York. That 
sarne day Cornwallis wrote sadly that it was too late, if Clinton 
came now he would risk losing his army too. Another council of 
war was held on the sixteenth at which the generals saw the 
futility of their landing plans. However, they were determined 
to see the matter through and land on the even more inaccessible 
Itappahannock. Cornwallis wrote to '\;lashington the next day pro-
posing a capitulation. 
It was not until October 1$ tt~t the army and navy, 
Clinton and Graves, and the all important wind, decided to play 
together. The army for the relief of Yorktown proceeded only as 
far as Sandy Hook when the tide turned against it. The armament 
did not get to sea until the nineteenth. Clinton wrote to 
Germain. from Graves t s flagship, that he would be in time to save 
, 
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Cornwallis. However, in a private letter, he wrote in a way to 
show that he knew that he was embarked on a hopeless expedition. 
Even if they defeated de Grasse, whose fleet still outnumbered 
the British, they would still have to deal with the combined 
forces of Washington and Rochambeau. Clinton bitterly blamed 
Germain for failing to send men and supplies and for misleading 
him into believing that Hodney would take care of de Grasse. 
Clinton and Graves reached the Chesapeake on October 24 
only to find that Cornwallis had surrendered his army five days 
earlier. 21 
The French viewpoint of this ca ... npaign is described in 
diary form in l:b.! OJ?erat~onl SlL t,he Frgncb F.e~t UndE!f the Cg:y,nt 
Ra Q£as,. in &78.-.182, edited by J. D. G. Shea: 
September 1st, our triops got in boats and were landed 
without the slightest molestation from the forces composing 
the army of Lord Cornwallis, although he had a ship-of-the-
line. three frigates, and several small vessels. The 
EnglIsh general mi~lt have prevented us from doing anything, 
and even repulsed us, had he not despised our small army_ 
At our first encampment it would have been annihilated if 
attacked. Three days after, it formed a junction with the 
army of M. de la Fayette, eighteen hundred strong, but Who, 
at the same time, received a reenforcement of eighteen hun-
dred more Americans t aaking in all seventy-six hundred. 
The English numbered eleven thousand men. When told that 
the French had landed. their general merely remarked that 
1 
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he had been long expecting them, and was glad that they 
had come. For all that, he soon had reason to repent it.22 
The 2nd, the Aigrette arrived from the head of the bay 
with several prizes made by our different vessels, among 
others by the cu,Rraff' whleh gave chase to the p~r~, of 
fifty guns but co not get at her on account 0 t 
shoals, and which was burnt during the siege of Yorktown. 
The 3rd, four of our vessels were detached, and 
stationed at the mouths of the rivers, by which we took a 
considerable number of merchantmen. \tie were in the greatest 
impatience in the consequence of the non-arrival of the 
CswcordE?, a frigate of 1-1. de Barras' squadron, which was to 
announce to us the moaant of the junction. In fact, we did 
not know what to make of the delay j and some of the navy 
officers, jealous of his merit, accused him of being a bad . 
citizen, and of being unwilling to serve under M. de Grass., 
because he had, he said, his option to remain at Boston or 
to join him. Already they wished to make him responsible 
tor the blunders the admiral was to commit. In these cir-
cumstances M. de Barras will be seen giving a rare exwnple 
ot patriotism, which is unfortunately known only by name in 
France. We were in the ~~eatest uncertainity as to what 
was to happen, when our two frigates on guard outside 
signalled sails in sight. These soon proved to be Enelish, 
to the number of twenty-one men-of-war, two of them three-
deckers, and five frigates. As a combat was deemed certain, 
orders were given to hoist 8al1. 23 
At halt-past eleven, orders were given to slip our 
cables, and leave the bouy; at noon, to clear decks, and to 
form in order at speed. This, for a wonder, was pretty well 
executed, for every vessel had a hundred men in the boats, 
which had, as I have said, been landinr; our troops. The 
fleet formed in very bad order; for, to tell the truth, 
there'were only tour vessels in line, the ~, the ~­
ggrt, the Matae1lla1§, and the Diagem!_ ~tGecbx 
an the ~ came next, half a teague to the ee or the 
first, rest of the fleet a league ~. to the lee 
22 SheaL Editor, The 0fir!t1516S .2l. thg French f~eet:: ;: nder ~he Count .9.! !:£§,@e ill I'ml-_~L. . 
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of the latter, the V;~lle ~ Par!! in the centre; the English 
were in the best possible order, b~wsprit to stern, bearing 
down on us, and conaequently to our windward. Admiral Graves 
commanded, having under h1m Rear-Admirals Hood and Drake; 
they made an immense number of signals to each other betore 
engaging us. The Fdlglish vessel, the T!£r1'Qhl. which was 
pumpin{~ tour pumps not feeling in a condition to take part 
in the action, kept to the windward ot the enemy's line, 
athwart Drake, who sienalled her to take her poSition, which 
she lost sOlllet1rilG in doing; but the rear-admiral soon per-
suaded her to take her place by sending her three cannon 
balls. Then it was that they tacked to the larboard as we 
did, and hoisted a great white flag astern; but they soon 
struck it and hoisted their own, It was then tive minutes 
atter three, and the head ot our l1ne was within rUle shot; 
and, in tact 1 entirely separate from the rest ot the fleet; 
a di8agreeab~e position. Then they poured their first 
broadside into the ifttleChy t killing the captain. That ves-
sel soon bore away as we! as the ~t on \~hich they kept 
up a brisk fire. +hen 1·1. de Grasse--sIT'9lulled to the vessels J 
at the head of the line, to bear away two points. which was 
impracticable:l as they were righ tint~ wi thin gun-shot dis-
tance wld WOUld have got a very severe handing, had they 
presented the stern. The four ships in the van found them-
selves, consequently, cut otf' trom the rest of the fleet, and 
constantly engaged with seven or eiGht vessels at close 
quarters; and the Qii4eme was constantly near Admiral Drake, 
who sat fire to her at every shot. the wadding en taring her 
side. This vesaal was constantly engaged with two and some..,. 
times three vessels. The Enelish wOdld not cut off our van, 
which they might perhaps have taken, and which they wOli.ld, at 
all events, have rendered past repair. They cm~ented them-
selves simply with euttine up that part of our fleet which 
kept up a distant fie;ht J the sailors of the 1,11e S!. PariA 
having been the last to take part in the act on. M. de Bou-
gainville commanded our van; but he was too tar to leeward 
and 1n no condition to relieve the DIAdems, Which could 
scarcely hold out, and was on the point ot boarding the 
~iQqlll!h commanded by the rear-admiral, who avoided her. ' 
en he turned all his fire on the ~*b.e, which he riddled, 
60 that the English had to sink her t le next day. ¥ii th all 
this, this vessel was utterly unable to keep up the fight, 
having only four thirty-six pounders and nine eighteens fit 
for use, and having all on board killed, \rounded, or burnt. 
At this juncture M. de Chabert, comroandine the ~ §lJ:rit, 
which had, tor a long time, been enGaGed with tne-En? 186 
admiral, and who was himself wounded, seeine the imminent 
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danger of the D~A4tm! hoisted sail and was soon in her wake 
then he opened a terrible fire that the gentlemen ot Albion 
could not stand,and had to haul their wind. The contest 
was kept to the centre for half an hour longer. For our 
part we were so tired, that though within Mrshot, the vans 
no longer fired. At six. the battle closed ..... 
In this affair we lost .four hundred men and twelve 
officers; the English came otf with the loss of seven hun-
dred men. and many persons of distinction. We had to go to 
the assistance of the lllid~m2 immediately after the battle, 
as she had lost one hundre and twenty men and had no saila 
or rigging! bavint~ received one hundred and twenty-five ball. 
in her hul, and twelve under the water line. We ahould 
have had to abandon her t had the sea run high, and do \tlith 
as the English did with the Ierr~l!. It is well to note 
that there were only tV'i8nty-two aneh vessels in this en-
gagement, all badly manned. The enemy had twenty ... one in 
line, one of fifty guns and some frigate. 
The English committed a great fault in this action. As 
soon as we lett the roads of the Chesapeake, they should 
have entered and anchored. They were before the wind, and 
by hu,~ng Cape Charles they might eas11y have moored with 
a spring in the cable, before we ''Iere formed in line and 
ready to attack them; this would lea.ve us no alt.ernat1ve, 
but to grapple them. Otherwise our army would have run the 
risk of being deprived of everythinet perhaps have been 
captured even; our vessels stationed at the York, Balti-
more, and James rivers woiid have been taken, as well as all 
the boats ot the fleet. Hood was in favor ot running 1n 
here as we shall see him do at St. Christopher's, but 
Admiral Graves durst not. Another blunder that our enemies 
made was their neglecting to cut oft our tour vessels at the 
bead t which they might perhaps have taken, or at least cut 
otf l"'rom the rest of the fleet. 2, 
There 18 no reproach to be made to M. de Grasse in this 
affair. except hi8 not making in time the signals to take 
position in order ot battle, and the blunder ot not 
24 ~ •• 69-72. 
25 ~q.f 72-73. 
136 
postinp; himself at the entrance of the bay and refusing to 
fight. He· committed II grosser blunder of this kind after-
wards; for, on this occasion, he might allege the tact that 
he was waiting for Cornmodore de Barras, and that he exposed 
him prodigously if he did not fight and force the enemy to 
open the entrance to the anchoraee of the Chesapeake. 
On the 6th, we did not lose sight of the English, and 
the wind haVing varied slightly, by maneuvering a great deal 
and the English little, we gained the weather-gage. 
The 7th we still kept them in sight. On this day they 
sank the tetr1bbe. In the evening we lost sight of them, 
the sea beg1nning to run high and the wind increasing,our 
admiral made us steer for the Chesapeake. We did not, how-
ever, make Cape Henry till the eleventh; and at the same 
time we saw two English frigates, the Iri; and &1CbmAAdl eac of forty guns chased by the glrrteJl' as ahe came up w th 
the former an~ engaged her at p ato shot distance; but she 
had to haul off, she got so hardly used. Seeing that they 
held out so, several of our good sailors got at their heels; 
the rest of the fleet joined, and we poured in over two 
hundred balls before they struck. We made the Count de 
Barras, who had been at anchor in the roads for two days, 
start out two vessels of his diVision. as he could not make 
out which nation we belonged to. He had witnessed the 
affair of the fifth, but being unable to distinguish the 
French fleet, he had anchored in the roads, where we found 
him. lie dropped our anchors at six or seven in the evening, 
well sut13fied with our prizes, and especially to get our 
boats again, which joined us this day, bringing back our 
best man. 
The 15th there came on board our fleet 1,1. de Gustine, a 
colonel of the regiment of Saintonge, commanding the van of 
General Wnshingtonts army, composed of a thousand French 
grenadiers J and as many American volunt eers. He proceeded 
to join ~1. De la Fayettet and announced the speedy arrival 
of the combined armies or France and America, with all 
necessaries of war, and provisions; for our troops suffered 
for want of the latter. 
On the 18th, the vessels bearing our soldiers arrived 
by the Baltimore river, and the greater part of the army, 
coasting along, and brineing from Philadelphia all that was 




camps, although this country had been completely devastated 
by the Enr).ish. The American general came on board the 
V;lle de Paris, where he had a long conference with M. de 
Grasse, and the other two naval commanders. On his depart-
ure he was saluted with thirteen guns. He joined his army, 
twenty thousand strong, including Rochambeau's and La-
fayette's armies. I think that when Lord Cornwallis was 
told of J.Ir. Washington's arrival, he did not say, "so much 
the be~5er,n and must have laughed on the wrong side of his 
mouth. 
The combined army having invested the English, they 
retired to Yorktown, posting a large detachment at Glouces-
ter, a town on the other side of the river, and immediately 
opposite York. The enemy had already put these two places 
in a respectnble state of defence, and four redoubts pro-
tected the approaches. They thought· proper however to 
evacuate'the smaller two, which were, too, farther off. On 
the 2Oth t l.tord Oornwallis wished to cross the river" but was prevented by the fire of our frigates and other smaLl craft, 
chiefly· prizes taken on that coast. As the wind became ver'1 
violent, ~{. de Grasse ran his fleet into the bar and anchor-
ed on a line, with springs on the cable. We al made our 
repairs then more at ease and got water more conveniently. 
It is worth remarking that we got it only by diggin four 
or five feet in the sand. This country is so well wooded 
that I saw on board the D+i1eme a piece of timber costing 
twenty-eight trancs, measur ng thirty feet long.and twenty 
inches square. You may judge from this that we all made 
our repairs easily and without sparing. 
On the 30th, M.. de Grasse disembarked six hundred 
marines from the vessels to reenforce M. de Choiey's corps. 
They repulsed the enemy. and compelled them to retire to 
Gloucester. The conmanders had established such'good com-
munication that we heard from the c~~p every day, and were 
even near enough to 8ee what was going on; for we witnessed 
the spectacle of the conflagration of an English fifty-gun 
ship, set on fire by the French battery. 
On the 19th of October, M. de Barras was sent to the 
camp in the admiral's place t and took part in the capi t ula-
tion of the positions of Yorktown and Gloucester, and of 
26 ~., 73-76. 
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Lord Cornwallis's army, composed of eleven thousand men, an 
army which had cOM.lni tted atrocities. 27 
The surrender at Yorktown cannot be traced to any sing14 
cause. Adams states it in this way: 
No one who has surveyed these sources can fail to be im-
pressed with the fact that the surrender at Yorktown, like 
most historic events, can not be traced to any single cause. 
It was the result of interacting causes. Germa.in's wrong-
headed favoritism and his failure to support his principal 
commander; Cornwallis's mistaken belie! that a British 
victory was an American defeat; Clinton's failure to divine 
the plans of Washington in time; the condition of Graves's 
fleet after the battle with de Grasse off the capes of the 
Chesapeake; Rodney's illness; Clinton's blindnessl Graves's 
incompetence; Hood's failure to keep track of de Grasse--
all these explain something. Nothing, however l can detract 
from the extraordinary patience and strategy or George Wash-
ington, who after watching ill luck for five years, at the 
last managed a campaign in which every essential e~eroent 
functioned on time and in time. This story might w~ll be 
entitled, 'When Britain failed to muddle through. f28 
27 Ib~4., 76-78. 






THE TREATY Ol-~ PAH.IS I 17 S) 
By the terms ot the Trea.ty of Paris, 1763 t which ended 
the War ot the American l:tevolutlon, the islands ot the West In-
dies were returned to their former owners. The one exoeption to 
this was the tiny island ot Tobago wh1ch was oeded by the British 
to France. This seems to be very little compensation for the aid 
sent through them to the Americ,an; ,rebel •• 
The secret or Ameri (".an suecess 1n the War or the Itevo-
lutiOll was coopel'".tion. J.1ore specifically J it was Franco-Ameri-
can cooperation. flo perr!k-ment success waa posa! ble t no permanent 
success was achieved, until practical coordination of effort was 
brought about between the allied enem!e. ot Great BritaIn.l 
fhe treaties 8Ianed in 178) affected prImarily four 
natloruu Spain, France. England, and tha United States. From 
, II 
1 Elizabeth 3 •. Kite. "The Significance or the Treaty. It 
.l:lli. kll1ix,g( PUi, or 1783. Washington, D. C., 19.35.25. 
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the first, Spain had lacked the necessary faith, disinterested-
ness, and consequently the Vision, to enter wholeheartedly into 
the Alliance. At the peace, signed by her and France with Eng-
land, she was forced to forego the chief object that had brought 
her to tardy entrance into the war. That cherished object was 
the reconquest of Gibraltar. 2 To compensate her for this loss 
Spain was allowed to retain Minorca and have all Florida, east 
and west, and Gr(~at Britain would keep Gibraltar.3 
Before the Dutch could arrive at any agreement with the 
British, the other parties had long since arranged tinal terms. 
In vain, the Dutch, with only perfunctory support from the French 
were clamoring tor the restitution ot aln captured colonies, tor 
outright recognition ot the prinCiples of the Armed Neutrality by 
Great Britain, and for damages for captures during the war in vi-
olation of them. The British, on their part, firmly demanded 
either Trincomalee, on the island of Ceylon, or Negapatan, on 
the southeast coast ot India opposite; the right to navigate 
freely among the Dutch possessions ot the East Indies; and the 
.2 ~., 32. 
3 Bemes, The n'P4gffi9CY &( the Amer,Can ~2!9lut1on, 
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humiliating salute of the British nag on the high leas by all 
the Dutch vessels, as before the war. Finally, Vergennes noti-
fied the Dutch plenipotentiaries that he could wait no longer 
for the relief from the financial expenditures that would come 
to France with a final peace, that Franee and her allies would 
sign the definitive treaties on September 3rd. The llutcb were 
farced to capitulate.4 
Looking at the final texts of the French and Span1ah 
treaties, we do not find that Great Britain, once accepting the 
inevitable loss ot the American colonies, tared 80 badly. She 
was required to cede the relatively unimportant island of Tobago 
to France, but she received back all the other conquered poa-
sessionsl Granada and the Grenadines, Dominica, St. Chl"iatopher, 
NeVis, Montserrat. She yielded to France the slave-trading 
preserve of the Senegal River, but retained one on the Gambia. 
She relinquished St. Pierre and Miquelon to provide France with 
tishing bases in the Gult of St. Lawrence, but clouded the c.s-
sion with declarations making it difficult to fit them tor naval 
bases. She continued French tishing rights on stipulated cout. 
of Rewtoundland, but1n doing this she was recognizing. in new 
~ater8. no mare than 'ranee already has possessed in others before 
l 
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the war. In India the articles of peace were astonishingly 
favorable to Great Britain. France gained no more than she had 
before 1778. In fact, the British were able to conclude peace on 
the principle that they first proposed, the independence of 
America and the Treaty of Paris ot 176) as a fundamental basis, 
with a rew exchanges, and minor cessions in North America and 
the eastern Mediterranean. To Spain, Great Britain gave up l:linor-
ca and the two Floridas, and agreed that the British wood-cutting 
settlements on the "Spanish Continent" should be restricted to 
a certain portion or the Honduran coast, between the Belize and 
Hondo rivers, and this without derogation to Spanish sovereignity 
there; but George III retained Gibraltar and with it control of 
the entrance to the P-lediterranean so valuable in those future 
wars when that sea was to be of vast importance to the preserva-
tion of the British Empire.; 
The crowning result of the Treaty was England's uncon-
ditional acknowledgment of American independence. Because of 
conquests in the northWest under George Rogers Clark, the United 
States secured much additional territory, and though it took 
another short conflict. that ot 1812. to shake loose Englandts 
5 llaJ1., 2;). 
'1 
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hold on those remote torts and to bring her to respect neutral 
shipping, yet for more than a century mutual goodfellowship has 
existed between England and the United States. 6 
As for France, restored self-respect, readmittance to 
her place of leadership in the councils of Europe, increased 
prosperity at home through a widened sphere of activity and more 
liberal trade regulations, compensated her far the sacrofoces 
~ade. Moreover, this heightened prestige, acquired by France 
through the happy peace of 178), so consolidated the nation that 
she weathered the storm which threatened to destory her after 
1789. Atter successfully repelling all invaders, she was able 
to reestablish herself on lines compatible with the adVancing 
civilization of Europe in which she again took her place as 
leader. 7 
As a result of the peace of 178) the age-old enmity or 
~rance and England gradually abated. Mutual respect took its 
place, and today we see the two nations facing together the 
problems that remain unsolved in the heart of Europe. 8 
As for the relations of America and France, the Comte 
:ie Vergennes from the first had worked not for gratitude, knowing 
6 Kite, "The Significance of the Treaty", 32. 




full well that this is never to be expected from any nation, 
least of all from republics. Instead. he worked for an abiding 
pea.ce. 
It has been said that to understand is to prophesy. Looking 
back over a period of a hundred and fifty years may we not 
speak with confidence for the future? May we not say that 
no matter what pa.ssing clouds may lower, the peace and good-
fellowshIp between France and the United States can never 
be broken by any war t because in the beginning the foundation 
stones were laid upon the eternal principles of justice and 
truth t and were cemente~ by fa.ith. generosity. mutual under-




From the very beginning of the Revolutionary \ilar, it 
was quite evident that no success could be achieved without out-
side help. Since the colonists could not obtain what was needed 
from England, they had to look elsewhere for supplies. \'ihen the 
Navigation Acts prevented them from openly trading with the 
neighboring islands of the West Indies, the Americans learned to 
carryon this trade illegally. It seemed only natural, there-
fore, that they should turn in their need to the French and 
Dutch West Indies. 
One of the greatest needs was that of gunpowder. Be-
cause the colonies did not have the materials necessary for its 
manufacture, they had to import it from the West Indies. Almost 
all of the r;unpowder imported during the first months of the war 
came through the island of St. Eustatlus from Holland. 
This tiny island, located in the middle of French and 
British possessions. was not restricted in its trade by the 
Dutch mother country. It was, therefore, able to trade with all 
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nations and became the Dutch emporium in the vleet Indies. Gun-
powder and other supplies were sent to St. Eustatius and there 
agents of the Thirteen Colonies would buy them and send it where 
it was needed. The island was also used to relay messages from 
colonial representatives in Europe to the Continental Congress. 
Colonial ships were allowed to anchor and trade at the island. 
One of them, the Andrew Doria, saluted the fort on leaving the 
harbor and had the salute returned. This was more than the 
British could stand. When they received no satisfaction for 
this insult and for its protest against the illegal trade. Eng-
land declared war. 
Before they knew of the declaration of war, the Dutch 
on St. Eustatius were ordered to surrender by the British admir~ 
Lord Rodney. Because of his desire for reveng and profit. Rodney 
spent more than three months stripping the island of all its 
wealth. This worked to the advantage of the colonists, for it 
enabled De Grasse to join the rest of the French fleet which Was 
going to the aid of Washington in the Battle of Yorktown. 
The French West Indies, too, played a very definite 
part in the Revolutionary War. In the first place, it was the 
fear ot losing her possessi,)ns in the West Indies which brought 
France into the war on the side of the colonists. Because the 
outcome ot the war was very doubtful, the French did not 
immediately give official recognition to the Americans. For this 
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reason. it became necessary to devise an elaborate scheme for 
sending secret aid to the colonies. According to Beaumarchais's 
plan, help, both arms and money, was sent to the colonies under 
the name of Hortalez and Company. Supplies were to be sent to 
this company in the West Indies and then sent to the colonies. 
when, at last, success was assured, France signed a Treaty of 
Alliance with the colonies in 1778. 
After the treaty was signed, France could send aid 
ppenly to the Americans. Part or this official aid was the 
French West Indian fleet. The fleet accomplished very little in 
~he way or a major victory; its only accomplishment was that it 
engaged the British rleet in a rew skirmishes and kept it away 
from the North American mainland. The greatest contribution of 
~he French fleet to the success ot the Revolution was the naval 
~upport it gave to Washington at the Battle ot Yorkto_n. With-
put this support it is doubtful if the sieee ot Yorktown would 
have been successful. 
With the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown British 
hopes of regaining the lost colonies vanished. The treaty which 
~nded the war was signed at Paris in 178). One wOLl.ld suppose 
~hat the British would want to punish the islands in the West 
Indies for the secret aid, as well as the smuggling and illegal 
I..Irade, which they gnve to the colonists. However, this was not 
~he case. With the exception of the island of Tobago, the 'West 
J 
Us 
Indies returned to the status quo of 1776. This .earned verT 
little reward for their great help. 
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